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I. INTRODUCTION
Incentive-laden executive compensation arrangements have
generated enormous paydays for many executives. The oft-staggering
amounts awarded to many executives had their genesis in the rise of the
celebrity chief executive officers in the aftermath of the leveraged
buyouts that were common in the 1980s.1 Tax law changes in 1993 and
the reticence of accounting standard setters to mandate a full accounting
of certain types of equity-based compensation contributed to the
proliferation of equity-based incentive schemes with the potential for

* Professor of Law, Lehigh University Perella Dep’t. of Finance, Bethlehem, PA.
1. See Daniel Altman, How to Tie Pay to Goals, Instead of the Stock Price, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 2002, at BU 4. Public opprobrium at outsized executive compensation has a long history.
See Alan Brinkely, Class Warfare: Railing Against the Rich: A Great American Tradition, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 7, 2009, at W1.
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enormous payouts.2 The accounting scandals that came to light in the
early part of this decade, the most prominent of which were perpetrated
by Enron and WorldCom, and the accompanying public outrage led to
legislative reforms in 2002.3 These reforms have done little to curb
executive compensation. Executive compensation has continued to
escalate, the gap between the top and average earners has continued to
widen, and pay practices have retained their ability to both amaze and
repulse the public.4
It is likely that had someone been told in 2006 that, within a few
years, Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns would no longer exist as
independent entities; the two mortgage giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, would be placed into conservatorship; Lehman Brothers would file
bankruptcy and liquidate; and that the federal governments would loan
billions of dollars to auto companies, banks, and insurance companies,
her reaction would have been either incredulity or sheer terror. The
economic catastrophe that was 2008 has, at least up to this point, created
a sea change in the attitudes toward executive compensation. The near
collapse of the financial system and its effect on the broader economy

2. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13211, 107 Stat.
312, 469-70 (1993) added section 162(m) to the Internal Revenue Code. This provision limits the
deductibility of compensation paid by publicly traded corporations to the chief executive officer and
the next four highest paid officers to $1 million per executive. However, excepted from this
restriction is performance-based compensation which includes cash bonuses based on performance
metrics, stock options, and certain other forms of equity-based compensation. In addition, generally
accepted accounting principles did not require, until very recently, an issuer of most compensatory
stock options to record compensation expense as a result of such issuances. See Matthew A.
Melone, Are Compensatory Stock Options Worth Reforming?, 38 GONZAGA L. REV. 535, 543-44,
554-58 (2003). See also infra note 250 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
4. Between 1947 and 1979 the top 0.1% of earners in the United States were paid
approximately twenty times as much as the average of the bottom 90% of earners. By 2006 the 20:1
ratio had grown to 77:1. More or Less Equal?, Special Report on the Rich, ECONOMIST, April 4,
2009, at 11. According to a Wall Street Journal analysis of Social Security Administration data,
approximately one-third of all earnings in 2007 were earned by highly compensated employees—
those whose wages exceeded the old age, survivor, and disability payroll tax base. The Wall Street
Journal’s analysis actually understates the percentage of income that flowed to highly compensated
employees because the data did not include the value of incentive stock options, unexercised
nonqualified stock options, and unvested restricted stock. Ellen E. Schultz, Pay of Top Earners
Erodes Social Security, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2009, at C4. See also Cari Tuna, Plush Perks Keep
Flowing Despite Outcry, WALL ST. J., April 3, 2009, at B1; Jonathan D. Glater, Stock Options Are
Adjusted After Many Share Prices Fall, N.Y. TIMES, March 27, 2009, at B1; Shelly Banjo,
Corporate News: Stock Options Are Ailing, but Aren’t Dead, WALL ST. J., March 18, 2009, at B2.
One type of pay practice caused considerable angst among the public – the payment of taxes for
executives on certain perks. This practice, the so-called tax gross-up, has been under considerable
pressure of late. See Cari Tuna, Firms End Key Benefit for Executives, WALL ST. J., April 21, 2009,
at B1.
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has boiled over an already simmering public, generating a level of public
anger that is more focused and intense than anything that has preceded it
– at least in this author’s lifetime.5 One scholar presciently stated,
“[c]hanging the business and financial culture by moving it away from
the self-interest ideology will take time, and it may take a financial
catastrophe to upset the status quo and lead people to question the
dominant perspective.”6 The financial catastrophe arrived, and the
extent of its damage has led to unprecedented federal intervention in the
financial system and other areas of the economy.7 Much of the blame
for our current economic situation has been placed squarely on
compensation practices that critics assert encouraged inordinate risktaking, were too focused on short-term results, and resulted in private
gain but socialized losses.8
In response, the federal government has, both legislatively and
administratively, interjected itself in the compensation arena to an extent
that would have been inconceivable a few years ago.9 Moreover, such
federal intervention and the massive losses suffered by investors have
emboldened shareholders to take a more proactive role in the executivecompensation process.10 Boards of directors, in turn, have begun to take
a more adversarial approach with executives in crafting compensation

5. Compensation practices are by no means the sole factor upon which blame is laid for the
current economic situation. See, e.g., When a Flow Become A Flood, ECONOMIST, Jan. 24, 2009, at
74-76 (discussing the United States’ meager savings rate and large trade imbalance); Greed - and
Fear, ECONOMIST, Jan. 24, 2009, at 3 (positing that the failure of mathematical models to
adequately assess risk and regulatory failures were also contributing causes). The opinion that
compensation practices contributed to economic crisis is by no means universally held. See Floyd
Norris, It May Be Outrageous, but Wall Street Pay Didn’t Cause This Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,
2009, at B1 (referring to an academic study that concludes that bank C.E.O. incentives were not to
blame for credit crisis or poor bank performance).
6. James Fanto, A Social Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 517, 525
(2007).
7. A recent Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll found that 69 percent of respondents were
either greatly concerned or quite a bit concerned about the federal government’s role in the
economy. See Laura Meckler, Public Wary of Deficit, Economic Intervention, WALL ST. J., June
18, 2009, at A1. Widespread federal government intrusion in the economy would be expected to
displease advocates for the self-correcting properties of free markets, but it has also provided fodder
for an apparently growing devolutionist movement. See Paul Starobin, Divided We Stand, WALL
ST. J., June 13, 2009, at W1 (reporting on growing secessionist sentiments in Texas, Alaska, and
Vermont).
8. See Gretchen Morgenson, Gimme Back Your Paycheck, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at
BU1.
9. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
10. See Morgenson, supra note 8.
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arrangements.11 As a result, a portion of executive compensation
increasingly has become subject to clawback provisions.
Such
provisions entitle the employer to recoup compensation paid or
discharge the obligation to pay compensation in the event that, with the
benefit of hindsight, such compensation was not earned.12 Clawback
provisions are not new. Certain officers of publicly traded companies
have been subject to such provisions since 2002.13 Contractual
clawbacks have been used in limited settings for some time, and longstanding common law remedies have been available to employers under
appropriate circumstances.14 Federal legislation enacted in 2008 and
2009 has broadened the scope of such provisions.15 Moreover,
corporations have begun to incorporate such provisions in their
executive compensation schemes with greater frequency.16
The repayment or forfeiture of compensation raises a myriad of tax
issues for the affected executives. The federal income tax system
operates on the basis of an annual accounting period.17 The fact that
compensation is taxed in one period and repaid or forfeited in a
subsequent period will not, almost assuredly, result in tax neutrality. In
addition to time value of money issues, the tax benefits attributable to
the repayment or forfeiture of compensation will depend on various
factors that may, or may not, place the executive in a position closely
approximating the tax posture that such an executive would have found
herself in had the compensation not been subject to tax in the first place.
11. See, e.g., Aaron Lucchetti, Goldman’s Blankfein Calls For Pay Change, WALL ST. J.,
April 8, 2009, at C3; Kathryn Jones, Who Moved My Bonus?, N.Y. TIMES, April 5, 2009, at BU1;
Phred Dvorak & Joann S. Lublin, Firms Rethink Compensation Plans, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2009,
at B1.
12. Compensation based on the attainment of certain metrics, such as earnings, earnings per
share, revenue, and the like may ultimately have not been earned if such metrics are required to be
restated. This is a common trigger in clawback provisions. See infra notes 35, 48, 58-60 and
accompanying text. See also Louise Story, Wall St. Profits Were a Mirage, but Huge Bonuses Were
Real, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008, at A1. United States accounting standards are, in many areas,
subject to the exercise of judgment. In other respects, such standards are very “rules based” and, as
such, may be manipulated in ways not contemplated by the drafters of such standards. See
generally Franklin A. Gevurtz, Corporate Governance and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Earnings
Management and the Business Judgment Rule: An Essay on Corporate Scandals, 30 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1261 (2004); Matthew A. Melone, United States Accounting Standards – Rules
or Principles? The Devil is Not in the Details, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV., 1161 (2004).
13. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (Bailout Bill), Pub. L. No. 110343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008); The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123
Stat. 115 (2009).
16. See supra note 11.
17. 26 U.S.C.A. § 441(b) (West 2009).
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The tax consequences will depend on several factors, including the
nature of the compensation subject to clawback, the circumstances
surrounding the clawback, and the executives’ unique tax position.18
Part I of this article discusses and analyzes clawbacks in general,
including clawbacks that are part of common-law remedial schemes,
federally legislated clawbacks, and those triggered by contractual
clawback provisions.
Part II of this article analyzes the tax
consequences to the executives that result from the repayment or
forfeiture of compensation. This part provides an analysis of the annual
accounting concept and the claim-of-right doctrine which will generally
result in the payment and return of compensation to be accounted for in
separate tax years and, concomitantly, will generally result in
incongruent tax consequences. The exceptions to the annual accounting
concept are discussed with particular emphasis on Section 1341, an
ameliorative provision. The tax consequences arising from the clawback
of compensation are heavily dependent upon the tax treatment of the
compensation that is clawed back. Accordingly, a detailed discussion of
the tax treatment of cash and equity-based incentive compensation
schemes is provided. In many cases, the tax treatment of clawbacks is
relatively straightforward – albeit somewhat punitive. However, in
certain instances, the tax consequences to executives subject to clawback
provisions are uncertain.
II. COMPENSATION CLAWBACKS
A. In general
Compensation clawbacks can be, and have been, supported by
long-standing state law legal and equitable principles.19 Active
participation by executives in the material misstatement of financial or
other information presented to the board of directors or shareholders
constitutes a breach of the duties of candor, good faith, and loyalty and

18. See infra Part II.
19. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 304(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7243
(2006) (requiring the CEO and CFO of a materially noncompliant issuer to disgorge profits and
refund to the company any bonuses earned within the last twelve months); David Blumenthal,
Source of Funds and Risk Management for International Energy Projects, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
267, 293 (1998) (discussing clawback provisions as a way for commercial lenders to mitigate risk);
George P. Roach, A Default Rule of Omnipotence: Implied Jurisdiction and Exaggerated Remedies
in Equity for Federal Agencies, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1 (2007) (discussing restitution,
disgorgement of profits, and clawback provisions).
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would provide ample support for a cause of action for damages or,
alternatively, restitution.20
An agent’s breach of fiduciary duty is a basis on which the agent
may be required to forfeit commissions or other compensation paid or
payable to the agent during the period of the agent’s disloyalty. The
availability of forfeiture is not limited to its use as a defense to an
agent’s claim for compensation.21
Moreover, the equitable remedy of restitution may be sought
regardless of whether the executive in question deliberately participated
in the conduct that resulted in the material misstatement. In a relatively
recent—and prominent—case, the Delaware Chancery Court, in a
derivative action, granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment
that the former chief executive officer of HealthSouth Corp., Richard
Scrushy, was unjustly enriched by the repayment of a loan with stock
whose value was inflated by accounting irregularities that subsequently
were disclosed to the public.22 The plaintiffs made no claim of
20. See id. In cases where the executive had no direct hand in perpetrating the misstatement,
but was duped by subordinates, it is likely that, absent gross negligence, the executive will be
protected from breach-of-duty claims by the business judgment rule. See A. Gilchrist Sparks, III &
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common Law Duties of Non-Director Corporate Officers, 48 BUS. LAW.
215 (1992). But see Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60
BUS. LAW. 439 (2005) (arguing that the business judgment rule should not protect non-director
officers). Professor Lyman’s distinction between officers and directors in the application of the
business judgment rule has prompted some criticism. See generally Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A.
Gilchrist Sparks III, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor
Johnson, 60 BUS. LAW. 865 (2005). The business judgment rule provides legal cover for actions
undertaken in good faith and made with all due care and recognizes that directors, not shareholders,
manage the corporation. A party challenging the board’s decision must overcome a presumption
that “the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis in good faith and in the honest belief
that the action was in the best interest of the company.” Orman v. Cullmann, 794 A.2d 5, 19-20
(Del. Ch. 2002) (quoting Arenson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. Ch. 1984)). The term
“restitution” is often used interchangeably with the term “disgorgement.” The former term is a
remedy intended to make the injured party whole while the latter focuses on the wrongdoer and
seeks to divest the recipient of the receipt of unjust benefits. See REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION
308(C) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, 19 (Securities and Exchange Commission 2003),
available at http://www.sec.gov./news/studies/SOA308creport.pdf.
See also Andrew Kull, Rescission and Restitution, 61 BUS. LAW. 569, 574-79 (2006) (discussing
efforts by the American Law Institute to clarify the standard for restitution).
21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. d(2). For an excellent analysis of
equitable remedies in this context, see Manning Gilbert Warren III, Equitable Clawback: An Essay
on Restoration of
Executive Compensation
(May 19. 2009),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1407129.
22. In re HealthSouth Corp., 845 A.2d 1096 (Del Ch. 2003). A similar result would be
supported by a claim of innocent misrepresentation or mutual mistake of fact. Id. at 1106-07. In the
case of mutual mistake of fact, the risk of loss will be allocated to the party in the better position to
prevent or recognize the mistake. Usually, as between a chief executive or chief financial officer
and the company, the former should be in a better position to prevent or be cognizant of the mistake.
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wrongdoing by the executive nor, in the opinion of the court, was such a
claim necessary. “[W]hether or not Scrushy breached a cognizable duty
. . . he was undoubtedly unjustly enriched . . . .”23 The Alabama
Supreme Court applied similar reasoning in requiring that Scrushy
forfeit bonuses he received from HealthSouth.24 Contractual provisions
that limit or preclude restitution may present obstacles to recovery, but
such obstacles may be overcome if the contract, including its provisions
limiting or barring restitution, is tainted by fraud or if some other
contract law defense is available, including violations of public policy.25
Corporations, however, are often reluctant to seek common-law
remedies against executives and shareholders and are often stymied in
their attempts to bring derivative actions or other private causes of
action.26 Moreover, settlement of claims that are brought generally
See, e.g., Roberts v. Century Contractors, Inc., 592 S.E.2d 215 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004). Such claims
would not be supportable if the misstatement occurred after the contract was formed, however.
Scrushy, acquitted of criminal charges in 2005, was recently ordered to pay $ 2.88 billion in a civil
action. See Valerie Bauerlein & Mike Esterl, Judge Orders Scrushy to Pay $2.88 Billion in Civil
Suit, WALL ST. J, June 19, 2009, at B1.
23. Id. at 1106.
24. Scrushy v. Tucker, 955 So. 2d 988, 1012 (Ala. 2006). Miller v. U.S. Foodservice, Inc.,
361 F.Supp. 2d 470, 484-85 (D. Md. 2005), in dicta, would limit restitution to cases involving the
breach of a contractual duty).
25. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Coughlin, 255 S.W.3d 424 (Ark. 2007)(voiding a retirement
agreement and release of claims due to fraudulent misrepresentations). See also Donald C.
Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives “Naked, Homeless and Without Wheels”: Corporate
Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate over Entity versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 627, 646-47 (2007). In extreme cases, such as AIG, some commentators believe
that bonuses could be recouped on unconscionability grounds or by asserting that such
compensation payments amounted to fraudulent conveyances. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham,
A.I.G.’s Bonus Blackmail, N.Y. TIMES, March 18, 2009, at A27. New York State Attorney General
Andrew Cuomo used this rationale to compel AIG to recover bonuses and other compensation paid
to certain executives. See David S. Hilzenrath, AIG Limits Pay of Its Top Executives, WASH. POST,
Nov. 26, 2008, at D01. Some members of Congress attempted another approach—punitive taxation
of erstwhile improper bonuses. See H.R. 1586, § 1(a), 111th Cong., 1st Sess., March 23, 2009
(imposing a tax of 90 percent on disqualified bonus payments); Jonathan Weisman et al., Treasury
Will Make Grab to Recoup Bonus Funds, WALL ST. J., March 18, 2009, at A1.
26. A decision not to seek repayment of compensation is subject to the cover provided by the
business judgment rule. Although the business judgment rule is inapplicable to self-interested
decisions, the Delaware courts have extended the doctrine’s protection to executive compensation
related matters in cases where the board of directors is comprised of a majority of independent
directors. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 365 (Del. 1994). Business
judgment protection has been codified with respect to stock option plans. “In the absence of actual
fraud . . . the judgment of the directors as to consideration for the issuance of . . . options and the
sufficiency thereof shall be conclusive.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, § 157 (1991). Moreover,
extraordinarily generous compensation packages containing terms that are extremely favorable to
executives are not subject to a “fairness” standard but instead are challengeable only if such
packages amount to waste of corporate resources. An act by directors that constitutes a waste of
corporate assets is void. Eric L. Johnson, Note, Waste Not, Want Not: An Analysis of Stock Option
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result in the enterprise, or its insurance carrier, funding the settlement—
what one commentator has referred to as the “double victimization” of
the shareholders.27 Public outrage directed at the compensation practices
of Wall Street, perceived to be one of the root causes of the current
economic dislocations, has put pressure on boards of directors to put in
place mechanisms that force the disgorgement or forfeiture of
compensation that, based on some standard of fairness, ought not be
retained or paid.28 Legislative developments in the aftermath of the
Enron and WorldCom scandals required clawbacks in limited
circumstances.29 More recently, as part of the federal bailout of financial
institutions, a new set of mandated clawbacks have been legislated.30

Plans, Executive Compensation, and the Proper Standard of Waste, 26 J. CORP. L. 145, 154 (2000).
The classical waste standard found waste to have occurred if “no person of ordinary, sound business
judgment would deem the consideration the corporation received worth what the corporation . . .
paid.” Id. at 155 (quoting Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962)). See also Lewis v.
Vogelstein, 699 A.2d. 327 (Del. Ch. 1997). The failure of shareholders to recoup the severance
payments paid by Walt Disney Co. to Michael Ovitz and the failure of Fannie Mae to seek
recoupment of incentive compensation from ex-CEO Franklin Raines after a multi-billion earnings
restatement evidences the difficulty facing shareholders of a corporation reluctant to pursue
executives on its own. See Steven H. Kropp, Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation,
Corporate Performance, and Worker Rights in Bankruptcy: Some Lessons From Game Theory, 57
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 32-35 (2007) (discussing the Michael Ovitz case); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse
M. Fried, Executive Compensation at Fannie Mae: A Case of Perverse Incentives, Nonperformance
Pay, and Camouflage, 30 IOWA J. CORP. L. 807, 810-11 (2005). Shareholder challenges to
executive compensation would come in the form of derivative litigation. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk
et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 751, 779 (2002). As such, the shareholders must first, with one exception, make a demand
on the board to investigate the claim and consider whether further action is appropriate. Id. at 870.
In almost all cases, the board, perhaps through a special litigation committee, will seek to have the
action terminated. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive
Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 576-77 (2001). The exception to the demand
requirement requires that shareholders establish that making such demand is futile by offering
particularized facts that create reasonable doubt that the directors are independent and that the board
is otherwise not protected by the business judgment rule—a difficult proposition. See Bebchuk et
al., supra, at 780-81. Shareholder action is further inhibited by the recent developments that have
tended to create obstacles to private causes of action. See generally Faith Stevelman, Corporate
Governance Five Years After Sarbanes-Oxley: Is There Real Change?, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 475,
495-96 (2007) (describing legislation and court decisions that have had a detrimental impact on
private securities law litigation).
27. Langevoort, supra note 25, at 632.
28. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
29. See supra note 9.
30. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221 (West 2009).
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B. Federal Legislation
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200231 was enacted in the aftermath of
the brazen frauds at Enron and WorldCom. Arguably, the most farreaching effects of this legislation have been felt by the accounting
profession.32 However, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did address certain
perceived abuses in the executive suite. Included among its provisions
are the imposition of trading bans during pension blackout periods, a
requirement of timelier reporting of insider transactions, certification
requirements for financial statements, and the grant of authority to the
Securities and Exchange Commission to seek a court order to
temporarily freeze extraordinary payments to directors, executives,
employees, and certain other persons.33
Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides for the clawback
This provision, however, applies in limited
of compensation.34
circumstances. Section 304 is applicable only to chief executive and
chief financial officers of publicly traded entities, and only if the
company is required to restate its financial results as a result of material
noncompliance with any financial reporting requirement under the
federal securities laws.35 Moreover, the material misstatement must
have occurred as a result of misconduct—a term left undefined by the

31. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 et. seq. (2006).
32. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 101-206, 116 Stat. 746-74 (2002). The legislation, inter
alia, created the Public Accounting Oversight Board with significant regulatory powers over firms
conducting audits of publicly traded corporations, prohibited independent accounting firms from
auditing public companies if certain officers of the company were employed by the audit firm
within the one year period preceding the audit, and instituted mandatory audit partner rotation. See
id.
33. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1031, 1044-45 (9th Cir.
2005)(en banc)(broadly defining the term “extraordinary payment”). Pension blackout periods are
periods in which participants in qualified plans are prohibited from trading employer securities.
This provision was enacted as a result of the losses suffered by Enron employees by their inability
to sell their Enron stock during the rapid decline in the value of such stock once Enron’s accounting
came under public scrutiny. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 302, 306, 401-403, 1103, 116
Stat. 777, 779-84, 785-89, 807 (2002).
34. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 at § 304.
35. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 304(a), 116 Stat. 778 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
7243 (2006)). A recent federal district court decision interpreted the statute to require an actual
restatement of earnings to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission in order to trigger
the clawback obligation. A mere discovery of accounting discrepancies will not suffice. S.E.C. v.
Shanahan, 624 F.Supp. 2d 1072, 1077-78 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 12, 2008).
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statute.36 In the event that Section 304 applies, its reach is, in part, both
narrow and broad. It is narrow in the sense that the clawback is limited
to compensation received in the twelve-month period following the first
public issuance or filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission
of the financial document that was ultimately restated.37 However,
during this relatively narrow window, the reach of the clawback is fairly
broad, encompassing any bonus, incentive-based or equity-based
compensation, and any profits received from the sale of employer
securities during the applicable period.38
The statutory language requires that all such compensation be
returned, regardless of whether a portion of such compensation would
have been payable notwithstanding the restatement.39 The courts have
held that there is no implied private right of action under section 304,

36. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 304(a), 116 Stat. 778 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
7243 (2006)). The statutory language also fails to make clear whether this provision is triggered by
the misconduct of any person or whether such misconduct must be perpetrated by the chief
executive or chief financial officer. Until recently, most practitioners believed that the Securities
and Exchange Commission would bring an action against an executive under § 304 only if such
executive had a hand in the misconduct. However, the Securities and Exchange Commission has
sought to impose § 304 against the former chief executive officer of CSK Auto Corp. due to the
misconduct of several subordinate executives. See Complaint for Violations of Section 304 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, S.E.C. v. Jenkins, No. 2:09-cv- 01510-JWS (D. Az. July 22, 2009).
37. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 304(a)(1)-(2), 116 Stat. 778 (2002). Rep. Barney Frank
of Massachusetts introduced legislation that would have expanded the coverage of § 304 to include
the disgorgement of profits generated from the exercise of stock options by the five most highly
compensated officers and directors if the price of the stock underlying the options declined by a
material amount at the end of a twelve-month period following the exercise of options by any such
officers or directors. See Executive Stock Option Profit Recapture Act, H.R. 4208, 108th Cong., 2d
Sess., April 22, 2004.
38. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 304(a)(1)-(2), 116 Stat. 778 (2002). Note, however, that
post-retirement payments are not included in the classes of income subject to clawback, regardless
of whether those payments have been inflated by phantom earnings. Post-retirement arrangements
are an effective method of camouflaging compensation. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 26, at
815. The Securities and Exchange Commission has recently approved a request by the Chicago
Board Options Exchange to modify its margin requirement to facilitate the writing of covered calls
on employee stock options. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-61026 (June 17, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/cboe/2009/34-60126.pdf. Under the new rule, vested stock options
could be used as collateral for covered calls written on the stock underlying the options. Prior to
this change, holders of stock options had to post cash collateral in order to write call options, a
requirement that often made such a strategy prohibitively expensive. Consequently, it is likely that
such strategies will become more prevalent. The language of § 304 does not appear to capture the
income from writing such call options. Covered call writing is a common technique to “juice”
returns from stock holdings. An aggressive interpretation of § 304 could include the income from
such activities if the underlying stock has been sold. Id.
39. The Securities and Exchange Commission has the authority to exempt persons from the
application of this provision. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 304(b), 116 Stat. 778 (2002).
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and its impact to date has been relatively modest. 40 However, its
enactment did bring public awareness to the lack of willingness on the
part of corporate boards to insist on disgorgement of bonuses and other
incentive compensation that, in hindsight, had not been earned.41 The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act can be viewed “as an expression of social outrage at
misconduct by some members of the elite . . . .”42 Unfortunately, it took
almost a decade and an economic catastrophe for clawbacks to figure
prominently in executive-compensation schemes.
2. Financial Bailout Legislation
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 200843 contained
restrictions on executive compensation applicable to financial
institutions that sell troubled assets to the U.S. Department of the
Treasury (Treasury), pursuant to its provisions.44 In the event that the
Treasury purchases troubled assets directly from a financial institution
and receives a meaningful equity or debt position in the financial
institution the legislation prohibits both compensation arrangements with
senior executive officers that include incentives to take unnecessary and
excessive risks and golden parachute payments.45 A senior executive

40. See, e.g., Kogan v. Robinson, 432 F.Supp. 2d 1075 (S.D. Calif. 2006); In re Bisys Group,
Inc. Derivative Action, 396 F.Supp. 2d 463, 464 (S.D. N.Y. 2005); Neer v. Pelino, 389 F.Supp. 2d
648, 657 (E.D. Pa. 2005). The board’s response to the massive restatement of earnings at Fannie
Mae is instructive in this respect. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 26. See also Rachael E.
Schwartz, The Clawback Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley: An Underutilized Incentive to Keep the
Corporate House Clean, 64 BUS. LAW. 1, 13 (2008). The Securities and Exchange Commission
used its authority under § 304 to reach a settlement with William McGuire in 2007 that required
McGuire, the former CEO of UnitedHealth Group, Inc. to return approximately $448 million of
compensation to his former employer. See Securities and Exchange Commission v. William W.
McGuire, M.D., Litigation Release No. 20387 (Dec. 6, 2007).
41. Supra note 8.
42. Fanto, supra note 6, at 521.
43. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008). This legislation authorizes the Secretary of
the Treasury to establish the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to “purchase, and to make and
fund commitments to purchase, troubled assets from any financial institution, on such terms and
conditions as are determined by the Secretary . . . .” Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008, § 101, 122 Stat. 3767 (2008). The sale of troubled assets to the federal government by
financial institutions may take place directly—the capital purchase program—or by auction.
Participants in the direct purchase program are subject to much more stringent compensation
limitations than those participating through auction. In addition, the Treasury has instituted other
programs such as the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility and programs tailored to specific
institutions. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
44. Id. at § 111.
45. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, § 111(b)(1)-(2), 122 Stat. 3765, 3776-77
(2008). If the Treasury purchases troubled assets through auction and such purchases exceed
$300,000,000, the legislation prohibits golden parachute arrangements with senior executive
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officer is defined as one of the top five highly paid officers, whose
compensation is required to be disclosed pursuant to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and non-public company counterparts.46 The
legislation also amended I.R.C. section 162(m) to limit the tax deduction
for compensation to covered executives to $500,000.47 In addition, this
legislation requires that compensation arrangements for senior executive
officers provide for the recovery of any bonuses or incentive
compensation paid that were based on earnings, gains, or other criteria
that are later proven to be materially inaccurate.48 Unlike Section 304 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, this clawback requirement is intended
to be enforced by the affected companies, does not require that the

officers that apply in the event of such officer’s involuntary termination, or in connection with the
financial institution’s bankruptcy filing, insolvency, or receivership. Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008, § 111(c) 122 Stat. 3777 (2008). Golden-parachute payments are defined,
for this purpose, as compensatory payments whose present value exceeds three times the
executive’s base amount. The base amount is defined by reference to I.R.C. § 280G(b)(3) and the
regulations thereunder. See U.S. Dep’t. of the Treas. Notice 2008-TAAP (Oct. 14, 2008), available
at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/Exec%20Comp%20TAAP%20Notice.pdf. Moreover, the
financial institution may not deduct executive compensation in excess of $500,000 for each
executive nor may any golden parachute payment be deducted. In addition, a 20 percent excise tax
is imposed on executives receiving golden-parachute payments. See Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008, § 302, 122 Stat. 3803-06 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(5) and 26
U.S.C. 280G(e)); I.R.S. Notice 2008-94, 2008-44 I.R.B. 1070 (Nov. 11, 2008). The Treasury
announced plans to develop a more stringent set of restrictions for systematically significant failing
institutions. See U.S. Dep’t. of the Treas. Notice 2008-PSSFI (Oct. 14, 2008), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/exec%20comp%20pssfi%20notice%20revised.pdf.
Moreover, the Treasury announced new rules for financial institutions that receive exceptional
assistance. These rules apply to financial institutions that need more assistance than that available
under the terms of the standard programs. Included among such institutions are Citigroup, Bank of
America, and AIG. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of the Treas., Treasury Announces New
Restrictions
on
Executive
Compensation
(Feb.
4,
2009),
available
at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg15.htm. The government has taken an aggressive stance with
such entities. See Michael R. Crittenden & John D. Knoll, Treasury Toughens Its TARP Contracts,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2009, at C3. Moreover, President Obama has appointed Kenneth R. Feinberg
as special master for compensation. In that role, Feinberg will oversee compensation related
matters for the firms that have received exceptional assistance from the federal government. See
Louise Story & Stephen Labaton, Overseer of Big Pay is Seasoned Arbitrator, N.Y. TIMES, June 11,
2009, at B1. Note that the tax-deduction limitations imposed by the act do not contain an exception
for performance-based compensation and apply to non-public recipients of assistance. See supra
note 2 for a discussion of the general limitation on the deductibility of executive compensation.
46. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, § 111(b)(3), 122 Stat. 3765, 3777 (2008).
47. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, § 302(a), 122 Stat. 3765 (2008). See
supra note 2 for a discussion of the general limitation on tax deductions for executive
compensation. The Treasury also issued an interim final rule that requires financial institutions to
agree, as a condition of participation in the capital purchase program, that tax deductions will be
limited to $500,000 for compensation paid to a senior executive officer. See Tarp Capital Purchase
Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 62,205 (Oct. 20, 2008) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 30).
48. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, § 111(b)(2)(B), 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).
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restatement be due to misconduct, applies to non-public institutions, and
is applicable to restatements of any performance metrics.49 In contrast to
Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the legislation does not
require the clawback of gains realized from the sale of securities.50
These provisions are to remain in effect for as long as the Treasury holds
a meaningful equity or debt position in the company.51
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 200952 amended
the executive-compensation provisions of the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008. The Act subjects any entity that has, or will,
receive financial assistance under the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP) to compensation standards.53 Such standards are to remain in

49. See generally The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.
50. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
51. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, § 111(b)(1), 122 Stat. 3765, 3777 (2008).
Section 111(b)(1) requires that “financial institutions meet appropriate standards of executive
compensation . . . .” This language appears to require that the financial institution itself institute the
clawback provisions and, therefore, such clawbacks should be enforceable by the institutions
themselves. Id.
52. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
53. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001, 123 Stat.
516, 517 (2009). The Act also requires recipients of TARP assistance to form board compensation
committees comprised entirely of independent directors. Moreover, shareholders of assistance
recipients are entitled to a non-binding vote on executive compensation. Id. at 519-20 (2009). The
Securities and Exchange Commission has recently proposed a new Rule 14a-20 that would
implement the statutory mandate. Under the proposed rule, publicly held TARP recipients would be
required to provide separate shareholder votes in proxies solicited for an annual meeting of security
holders, or special meeting in lieu of an annual meeting. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-60218
(July 1, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2009/34-60218.pdf. This “say on
pay” requirement has been a corporate governance issue for quite some time. It is not clear how
shareholders will respond but there are indications that they may be ready for some muscle flexing.
See Phred Dvorak, Investors Diverge as Votes on Pay Near, WALL ST. J., April 14, 2009, at B3;
Craig Karmin, Shareholders Renew Push to Regulate Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2009, at
C1. The Securities and Exchange Commission has not provided shareholders of non-TARP
recipients with a “say on pay,” although some prominent companies, such as Verizon
Communications and Motorola, have provided shareholders with a nonbinding vote on executive
compensation. See Joann S. Lublin, A Quiet Response to ‘Say on Pay’ Measures – So Far This
Season, Shareholders are Supporting Compensation Packages, Most Board Nominees, WALL ST. J.,
May 18, 2009, at B6. During the current proxy season, as of August 15, 2009, 68 shareholder
proposals for an advisory vote on executive compensation have been submitted and have garnered
45.8 percent of the votes cast. See 2009 PROXY SEASON SCORECARD (RiskMetrics Group 2009),
available at http://www.riskmetrics.com/knowledge/proxy_season_scorecard_2009. The House of
Representatives has passed a bill that would require publicly traded entities to provide shareholders
with a nonbinding vote on executive compensation and golden parachute arrangements. See
Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 3269, 111th Cong. § 2
(2009). Shareholders of British firms do have the ability to cast advisory votes on compensation
matters and have increasingly dissented on management proposals—including a remarkable 59
percent vote against the compensation plans of Royal Dutch Shell Group. See Muck, Brass and
Spleen, ECONOMIST, May 21, 2009, at 70; Guy Chazan & Joann S. Lublin, Shell Investors Revolt
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effect for so long as any obligation under the TARP program remains
outstanding.54 The compensation standards under the act retain the
prohibition on incentives that lead to unnecessary and excessive risk,
impose the previously discussed tax deduction limitations more broadly,
further restrict golden parachute payments, and expand the clawback
provisions to include retention bonuses.55 Moreover, the number of
employees whose compensation is subject to clawback is expanded to
include, in addition to senior executive officers, the next twenty most
highly compensated employees.56 The legislation also prohibits the
payment or accrual of any bonus, retention award, or incentive
compensation during the period that an obligation under the TARP
program remains outstanding.57 An exception is made for the payment
of restricted stock provided, however, that such stock does not fully vest
during the period in which any obligation under the TARP program
remains outstanding and that the value of such stock does not exceed
one-third of the recipient’s total compensation.58 The prohibition on the
payment of incentive compensation would seem to limit the applicability
of clawback provisions applicable to such payments. However, the class

Over Executive Pay Plan, WALL ST. J., May 20, 2009, at B1. The Obama administration has
recently sought legislation that would grant shareholders a say on executive-compensation
arrangements. See Stephen Labaton, Treasury to Set Executives’ Pay at 7 Ailing Firms, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 2009, at A1. The Obama administration has also proposed rules that would
strengthen the independence of board-compensation committees and regulate the practices of
compensation consultants. See Principles, Not Pitchforks, ECONOMIST, June 11, 2009, at 68.
54. The standards are not applicable if the Federal Government holds only warrants to
purchase common stock of the TARP recipient. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001,123 Stat. 517 (2009). The Auto Industry Financing and
Restructuring Act would have imposed similar restrictions on the compensation of executives of
automobile manufacturers. See H.R. 7321, § 12(b) 110th Cong., 2d Sess., Dec. 10, 2008.
55. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001, 123 Stat.
517 (2009). See also supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text. The number of employees
restricted from receiving golden-parachute payments is expanded to include, in addition to senior
executive officers, the next five most highly compensated employees. Moreover, the definition of
golden-parachute payments is modified to include any payments for departure from a company for
any reason, except for payments for services rendered or benefits accrued. Id.
56. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, § 7001, 123 Stat. 517 (2009).
57. Id. This prohibition does not apply to any bonus payment required to be paid pursuant to
a written employment contract executed on or before February 11, 2009. American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, § 7001, 123 Stat. 518 (2009). However, the Treasury may review preenactment compensation of senior executive officers and the next twenty most highly compensated
employees of TARP recipients and require, if such compensation is deemed inconsistent with the
purposes of the Act or the TARP, such employees to reimburse the federal government with respect
to such compensation. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §
7001, 123 Stat. 520 (2009).
58. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001, 123 Stat.
518 (2009).
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of executives to whom the clawback provisions apply may be broader
than the class of executives to whom the payment prohibition applies.59
C. Contractual Clawback Provisions
Whether, as a policy matter, legislated or administratively
mandated curbs on executive compensation are effective is beyond the
scope of this work.60 Public opprobrium directed at Wall Street and the
banking industry does create the risk that political considerations will
lead to overly restrictive compensation practices that stifle prudent risktaking activities. On the other hand, the fact that clawback provisions
had to be legislated speaks volumes about the failure of boards to
adequately police executive compensation arrangements. It should come
as no surprise that the government filled the vacuum left by private
industry. What is certain is that the federal government’s efforts have
created a great deal of uncertainty with respect to executive
compensation practices and have led, and will continue to lead, to
attempts to avoid government imposed restrictions.61 The economic
59. The provisions limiting such payments and the exception thereto apply to a number of
employees of the TARP recipient that depends on the amount of financial assistance received. For
assistance less than $25,000,000 these provisions apply to the most highly compensated employee.
For assistance between $25 million and $249,999,999 these provisions apply to the five most highly
compensated employees. Id. at § 111(b)(3)(C)(ii)(II). For assistance between $250 million and
$499,999,999 these provisions apply to the senior executive officers and the 10 most highly
compensated employees. Id. at § 111(b)(3)(C)(ii)(III). For assistance of $500 million or more these
provisions apply to the senior executive officers and twenty most highly compensated employees.
Id. at § 111(b)(3)(C)(ii)(IV).
60. The statutory curbs have been criticized on several grounds. The restrictions target
incentive compensation which, according to critics, will lead to a greater reliance on base salaries
not tied to performance. See Eric Dash, Citigroup Has a Plan to Fatten Salaries, N.Y. TIMES, June
24, 2009, at B1. According to such critics, the problem was not incentive compensation per se but
the incentive structures in place. Other criticisms include assertions that such restrictions will lead
to a flight of talent out of the financial sector, that the curbs are unconstitutional, and, at the other
end of the spectrum, that they don’t go far enough. See, e.g., Susanne Craig & Joann S. Lublin,
Financials Post Sign of Times: CEO Wanted, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2009, at C1; David Gillen, The
Brain Drain Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at WK1; Judith F. Samuleson & Lynn A. Stout,
Are Executives Paid Too Much?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2009, at A13; Lucian Bebchuk, Pay Caps
Debate: They Don’t Go Far Enough . . . , WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2009, at A11; Andrew P. Napolitano,
. . . They Violate Good Sense and the Constitution, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2009, at A11. According to
data released by New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo, nine banks that received TARP
funding paid approximately $33 billion in bonuses in 2008. See Susanne Craig & Deborah
Solomon, Bank Bonus Tab: $33 Billion, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2009, at A1. Although overall
compensation expenses at these institutions were less in 2008 than in 2007, as a percentage of
revenues compensation expense actually increased in 2008 from the comparable figures in 2007.
Id.
61. The statutory curbs on compensation are not a model of clarity and raise a number of
implementation issues. For example, the pay curbs imposed on a defined number of highly
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crisis, and the federal government’s response to it, has, however,
changed the nature of the debate with respect to executive compensation
in the private sector. In industries far removed from Wall Street, boards
are approaching executive compensation in a much more adversarial
fashion and are instituting long needed reforms, including clawback
provisions.62
Contractual clawback provisions are commonly used as part of noncompete and non-disclosure agreements.63 For the most part, such
provisions have withstood legal challenges.64 More recently, however,
such provisions have become a more prominent feature in executive
compensation arrangements. 65 A recent survey by The Corporate

compensated employees, discussed at supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text, do not provide
guidance as to when a company is to make the determination of which employees are covered by
the curbs. Moreover, the incentive pay curbs virtually assure that employees that are covered in a
given period will not be the most highly compensated in the subsequent period. It is not clear if the
legislation had in mind a revolving door of persons covered. Moreover, the Treasury is given wide
discretion in setting terms with firms that receive extraordinary assistance. Without some sort of
standards private firms face a tremendous amount of uncertainty. The Obama administration has
appointed a Special Master of Compensation to coordinate compensation related issues. See
Deborah Solomon, U.S. News: White House Set to Appoint a Pay Czar, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2009,
at A4. Firms are also beginning to restructure compensation arrangement to provide greater
emphasis on base salaries. In addition, the executive compensation curbs have been a contributing
factor that have led many firms to seek to repay TARP funds as quickly as possible. See Aaron
Lucchetti, Morgan Stanley Boosts Salaries As Its Bonuses Are Limited, WALL ST. J., May 23, 2009,
at B1; Mark Maremont & Joann S. Lublin, Loopholes Sap Potency of Pay Limits, WALL ST. J., Feb.
6, 2009, at C1; Eric Dash, 10 Large Banks Allowed to Exit U.S. Aid Program, N.Y. TIMES, June 10,
2009, at A1 (reporting that ten financial institutions have been allowed to repay $68.3 billion, more
than a quarter of the funds received by banks since October 2008).
62. It is ironic, given the general perception that professional athletes are coddled and
excessively compensated, that one enterprise that has aggressively enforced clawback provisions is
the National Football League. Professional football player contracts are unique in that, unlike the
contracts of professional baseball, basketball, and hockey players, football player contracts are not
guaranteed. See generally Robert Forbes, Note, Call on the Field Reversed: How the NFL Players
Association Won Big on Salary Forfeiture at the Bargaining Table, 6 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 333,
336-37 (2007). As a result, players commonly negotiate signing bonuses that provide substantial
up-front money to the players. Id. at 337. The collective bargaining agreement between the
National Football League Players’ Association and the team owners provides for a clawback of
signing bonuses under numerous circumstances. Id. at 337-38.
63. Such provisions are subject to the challenges that are typically brought against noncompete agreements, such as unreasonable restraint of trade issues. With respect to the forfeiture of
options or stock, these provisions are sometimes challenged on the grounds that such provisions
represent an unreasonable restraint on alienation or that such provisions cannot co-exist with
requests for injunctive relief. See generally Richard E. Wood, Bad Boys (and Girls) Get Clawed
Back, 18 BENEFITS L. J. 84, 90-93 (2005).
64. Id.
65. Gretchen Morgenson, Pay It Back If You Didn’t Earn It, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2008, at
BU1 (reporting on a survey of 2,121 companies). Although 14 percent of the sample appears
meager, it is a substantial improvement from the less than 8 percent result from a similar study
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Library found that 14 percent of surveyed corporations instituted some
form of contractual clawback feature in their executive compensation
arrangements.66 Approximately 44 percent of these provisions are
triggered by fraud or some other form of misconduct while
approximately 39 percent are crafted to recoup funds because of
financial restatements.67 The Securities and Exchange Commission’s
compensation disclosure rules require that corporations disclose their
clawback policies in their proxy statements as part of the broader
discussion of executive compensation policies.68 Shareholders have
become increasingly assertive in proposing that clawback policies be
adopted or strengthened and the Securities and Exchange Commission
has viewed corporate attempts to keep such proposals out of the proxy
statements with skepticism.69
The implementation of contractual clawback provisions raises a
host of managerial and legal issues. On the one hand, corporations
should design these provisions to incorporate basic notions of fairness in
the event that performance metrics have not been met and, moreover, to
conducted in 2003. See id. (reporting that only fourteen companies had clawback provisions four
years prior). The survey, Paul Hodgson, 2008 Proxy Season Foresights #11, Analyst Alert (The
Corporate Library, June 4, 2008), is available for purchase from The Corporate Library. Another
study by Equilar, Inc. found that 42.1 percent of the Fortune 100 companies have instituted
clawback policies by 2006. See CLAWBACKS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATIONS (Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher, LLP July 9, 2008), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/Publications/Pages/
ClawbacksOfExecutiveCompensation.aspx.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b)(2)(viii) (2008).
69. In the period between January 2004 and June 2008, thirty-two shareholder proposals
requesting the implementation of clawback provisions were submitted. CLAWBACKS OF
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATIONS, supra note 65. The proposals garnered the most shareholder support
in 2007 with almost 29 percent of votes cast supporting such proposals. Id. In 2008, only 10.7
percent of votes cast supported such proposals. Id. With respect to shareholder proposals seeking
to strengthen existing clawback provisions, corporations often seek to exclude such proposals from
shareholder consideration on the basis that the company has “substantially implemented” the
proposal. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(10) (2006). However, the Securities and Exchange
Commission has permitted companies to exclude such proposals only in cases where the proposal
closely corresponds to existing clawback provisions.
See CLAWBACKS OF EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATIONS, supra note 65. In the case of participants in the TARP program, it is likely that
shareholder proposals to implement executive compensation policies will be subject to such
challenges. See Letter from Regions Financial Corp. to the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Omission of Shareholder Proposal Pursuant to Rule 14a-8 (Dec. 19, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2008/columbosheetmetal121908-14a8incoming.pdf. Shareholder proposals that contain clawback provisions that may be difficult to
interpret and implement may also be challenged by the issuer on the grounds that such proposals are
misleading because they are too vague and indefinite. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(3) (2006);
Verizon Communications, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 SEC No-Act LEXIS 299 (Feb. 21,
2008); General Electric Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 SEC No-Act LEXIS 190 (Feb. 5, 2003).
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prevent excessive risk taking and an undue focus on short-term results.
On the other hand, corporations must consider the possibility that
draconian clawback provisions will stifle prudent risk taking and hamper
the corporate recruitment of new talent and the retention of existing
talent. Companies must decide to whom the clawback provisions will
apply. Limiting such provisions to those executives covered by Section
304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 will, for most companies, prove
under-inclusive because it is likely that many more employees will be
entitled to performance-based compensation and will have performed
functions that the clawback provisions are designed to regulate.70
Provisions triggered by accounting restatements should be, in all
fairness, implemented to apply to any employee whose compensation
was based on erroneous figures.
A significant issue in the drafting of clawback policies is whether
such policies are triggered by misconduct of the employee or are of a
“no-fault” variety. In the event that the trigger is misconduct, the types
of actions—or lack thereof—that constitute misconduct need to be
expressed.71 Equitable considerations appear to favor no-fault policies

70. A number of prominent corporations have adopted clawback provisions with extremely
limited coverage. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., Schedule 14A, Proxy Statement Filed Pursuant to
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at 24 (Sep. 29, 2008) [hereinafter Microsoft
Proxy
Statement],
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/789019/
000119312508203233/ddef14a.htm (applying clawback provisions to executive officers and the
principal accounting officer); Qwest Communications International, Inc., Schedule 14A, Proxy
Statement Filed Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at 36-37 (March
18, 2009) [hereinafter Qwest Communications Proxy Statement], available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1037949/000104746909002842/a2191552zdef14a.htm#du
12401_equity_compensation_plan_information (applying clawback provisions to executives).
71. Among the issues that should be addressed is what level of participation is required by the
employee in the improper accounting. For example, misconduct could be defined as direct
participation with the intent to prepare false information, or it could be defined to include
negligence in failing to detect inaccuracies and numerous variations in between these two standards.
Several prominent corporations have adopted clawback policies triggered by fraud or other forms of
misconduct. See, e.g., Verizon Communications Inc. Schedule 14A, Proxy Statement Filed
Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at 39 (March 23, 2009), available
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/732712/000119312509060836/ddef14a.htm#toc95746_
21; Microsoft Proxy Statement, supra note 70, at 24; General Electric Co., Schedule 14A, Proxy
Statement Filed Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 22 (March 3,
2009),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40545/000119312509031738/
ddef14a.htm#tx96252_2. Qwest Communications considers misconduct as one factor in the
decision to exercise a clawback. Qwest Communications Proxy Statement, supra note 64, at 36-37.
The company has, however, adopted a much broader clawback policy with respect to executive
severance payments. Id. at 51 (subjecting severance payments to clawback due to, inter alia, acts
involving moral turpitude, the conviction of a crime, and actions that reflect negatively on the
company). In contrast, Pfizer, Inc. has adopted a clawback policy that is not predicated on
misconduct. See Pfizer, Inc., Schedule 14A, Proxy Statement Filed Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the
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when dealing with compensation measured by specific performance
metrics that, in hindsight, due to misstatements, were not met. However,
such no-fault provisions will likely prove extremely unpopular with
employees and could hamper employee recruitment and retention
efforts. The scope of the clawback provisions is another important
consideration in drafting such provisions. Section 304 of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 is relatively broad in scope, encompassing both
incentive compensation and profits from the sale of securities.72 TARP
recipients, although not obligated to return profits from the sale of
securities, are also subject to broad clawback provisions that include
retention bonuses within their reach.73 An additional consideration is the
timeframe under which such provisions operate.74 Section 304 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 provides a relatively modest twelve-month
timeframe whereas the TARP legislation provides no such limit.75 It
appears that clawback time frames can be comfortably extended to the
extent that the clawback would result in the forfeiture of compensation
accrued, but not yet paid. For example, many companies, in light of the
criticisms directed at bonuses based on short-term results, have instituted
long-term holding requirements for equity awards granted to executives.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at 60 (March 12, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/78003/000119312509053142/ddef14a.htm#toc58878_47.
72. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 does not
apply to the profit made through the exercise of stock options. See supra note 37 and
accompanying text.
73. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. It is extremely rare for clawback policies to
reach qualified-pension and profit-sharing-plan income subject to the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974). This legislation contains
anti-forfeiture provisions that would inoculate vested benefits from clawback provisions. However,
it is possible for such provisions to reach non-vested benefits. See generally Clark v. Lauren Young
Tire Center Profit Sharing Trust, 816 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1987). However, because such plans are
subject to strict limitations on benefits targeted at high income employees, such income is a
relatively small portion of executive compensation. Certain types of plans are not covered by
ERISA’s anti-forfeiture rules. These plans are designed to supplement the qualified plan benefits of
top management and highly compensated employees. A discussion of ERISA is well beyond the
scope of this work. For a general overview of this legislation see PAUL J. SCHNEIDER & BRIAN M.
PINHEIRO, ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE (3d ed. 2007).
74. Retroactive application of clawback provisions raises a number of enforcement issues. For
example, such provisions may violate the express terms of existing contracts and, to the extent that
they do not, may be unenforceable due to a lack of consideration. Of course, in cases where federal
law provides for the clawback of compensation, such clawback will withstand any state law
contractual claim to the contrary. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. Companies that have instituted
clawback provisions need to exercise care in executing severance or termination arrangements with
employees. Oftentimes such arrangements come with a reciprocal release of claims by the parties.
A release of claims by the company may, if not carefully avoided, encompass any claim to
compensation pursuant to a clawback provision.
75. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010

19

Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 25 [2010], Art. 2

MELONE_MACRO FROM WESTERN 3.3.10.DOC

74

AKRON TAX JOURNAL

3/15/2010 11:27 AM

[25:55

These policies, termed “hold til (or through) retirement” requirements,
mandate that a portion of equity awards be held until, or through,
retirement.76 A relatively long timeframe for which such awards are
subject to clawback should meet less employee resistance than policies
that reach back and require repayment of compensation for which the
recipients had unfettered use.
Finally, careful consideration should be given to whether the board
of directors should be given discretion in applying clawback provisions.
Board discretion offers companies the ability to exercise such provisions
as particular circumstances warrant.77 However, board discretion is
likely to call into question the firm’s commitment to the instituted
policies and perhaps raise the ire of shareholders.78 Discretionary
clawbacks may also be subject to challenge under state wage-payment
laws.79 Although such laws vary from state to state, incentive
compensation often—but not always—falls outside the scope of wagepayment laws.80 Clearly expressed contractual rights to clawback
incentive compensation based on objective standards should also prevent
clawbacks from running afoul of state law in states where the incentive
compensation is subject to the statutory provisions in question.81
76. The TARP legislation institutes a variant of this type of restriction with respect to
incentive compensation. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
77. Qwest Communications International, Inc. has incorporated significant board discretion in
its clawback policies. In the event of an accounting restatement that resulted in the improper
payment to an executive then such compensation may be clawed back if the board decides “it is in
our best interests to recover the performance-based compensation paid to that executive . . . .”
Qwest Communications Proxy Statement, supra note 70, at 37.
78. Provisions granting the board discretion are likely to generate shareholder proposals for
tougher provisions. It is unlikely that the Securities and Exchange Commission will grant
management the right to exclude such proposals from a shareholder vote. See supra note 69 and
accompanying text.
79. State wage-payment laws were enacted to prevent employers from avoiding their
obligations under, inter alia, collective bargaining agreements and minimum-wage statutes.
California’s statute, for example, provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any employer to collect or
receive from any employee any part of wages theretofore paid by said employer to said employee.”
CAL LAB. C. § 221 (2009).
80. See, e.g., Int’l Bus. Machines Corp. v. Bajorek, 191 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding
that stock options were not wages for purposes of the California wage payment law); Int’l Paper Co.
v. Suwyn, 978 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that incentive compensation dependent upon
the financial results of the employer are not wages for purposes of New York’s wage-payment
statute). A clawback cannot cause an employee’s compensation to fall below federal or state
minimum wage levels—an unlikely event with respect to executive compensation. Id. at 514.
81. Pennsylvania law, for example, includes incentive compensation within the scope of its
wage payment law. See Hartman v. Baker, 766 A.2d 347 (Pa. Super. 2000). Wage-payment laws
do not, however, create an entitlement to compensation. The compensation must be earned or
vested under the terms of the contract. Therefore, a clawback trigger that is clear and unambiguous
will more likely withstand a claim that the compensation in question was earned or vested and thus
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The enforcement of clawback provisions raises a number of federal
income tax issues for the executives that are subject to these provisions.
The tax consequences in the year the compensation is clawed back
depend on various factors, including whether the compensation in
question had been paid to the executive, the nature of the compensation
clawed back, the executive’s particular tax circumstances, and the reason
for the clawback. In many respects, federal income tax law will treat
such executives harshly – a perverse form of poetic justice. Executives
will often find that the forfeiture of unpaid and heretofore untaxed
compensation is preferable than the repayment of previously taxed
income.
III. FEDERAL INCOME TAX IMPLICATIONS OF COMPENSATION
CLAWBACKS
Intuitively, the repayment or forfeiture of compensation that had
been subject to tax in an earlier tax year should result in a tax benefit
commensurate with the tax burden imposed on the compensation in the
year it was taxed. However, the annual accounting principle virtually
assures that this is not the case. This principle spawned the judicially
created “claim of right” doctrine pursuant to which income that may be
later forfeited or disgorged is nonetheless subject to tax in the year of its
receipt.82 Correspondingly, the repayment of compensation will yield a
deduction in the year of repayment.83 Due to the peculiarities of the
Internal Revenue Code, it is likely that such deduction will fail to yield a
tax benefit commensurate with the tax burden imposed upon the income.
In the event that the taxpayer fails to recoup the taxes originally imposed
on the compensation in question, Internal Revenue Code Section 1341
provides relief if the taxpayer has the fortune to qualify under its
provisions. This part provides an analysis of the annual accounting
principle, the claim-of-right doctrine, and Section 1341. In addition,
because the tax consequences of compensation clawbacks depend, in
large part, on the taxation of the income that is clawed back, the taxation

subject to the wage payment law. See, e.g., Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310,
1325 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Redick v. Kraft, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 296, 303 (E.D. Pa. 1990). In Kafando v.
Erie Ceramic Arts Co., 764 A.2d 59 (Pa. Super. 2000), the court held that bonuses based on the
employer’s gross profit ratio were not wages under the Pennsylvania wage-payment statute. Id. at
62. The court based its holding on the fact that such earnings were not based upon an employee’s
time or task. Id. It is unlikely that such a rationale would support the exclusion of incentive
compensation for executives.
82. North Am. Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 424 (1932).
83. 26 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).
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of various forms of incentive compensation is discussed. Finally, an
analysis of the tax treatment of clawbacks under a myriad of
circumstances is provided.
A. Annual Accounting Principle
Practical considerations dictate that taxpayers’ obligations to the
United States Treasury be determined at some pre-defined interval.84 In
the seminal case of Burnet v. Sanford and Brooks Co., the Supreme
Court stated that:
The Sixteenth Amendment was adopted to enable the government
to raise revenue by taxation. It is the essence of any system of taxation
that it should produce revenue ascertainable, and payable to the
government, at regular intervals. Only by such a system is it practical to
produce a regular flow of income and apply methods of accounting,
assessment, and collection capable of practical operation.85
U.S. income taxes are determined on the basis of an annual
accounting period. I.R.C. section 441(a) states, “[t]axable income shall
be computed on the basis of the taxpayer’s taxable year.”86 In most
cases, a taxpayer’s taxable year will encompass a period of twelve
calendar months.87 The annual accounting concept is an artifice borne
out of administrative convenience. Due to the all too numerous
idiosyncrasies of the Internal Revenue Code, the segmentation of a
taxpayer’s tax obligations into annual compartments virtually assures
that two taxpayers with identical incomes over an extended period of
time will incur different tax obligations. For example, progressive tax
rates may cause the taxpayer whose income is subject to peaks and
valleys to bear a greater tax burden than the taxpayer earning identical

84. The annual accounting system is “a practical necessity if the federal income tax is to
produce revenue ascertainable and payable at regular intervals.” Hillsboro Nat’l. Bank v. Comm’r,
460 U.S. 370, 377 (1983).
85. 282 U.S. 359, 365 (1931).
86. There are various references in the Internal Revenue Code to the taxable year. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. §§ 11 (2006) (imposing tax on corporations for each taxable year); 6012 (2006) (requiring the
filing of income tax returns of individuals and certain entities that exceed certain income thresholds
during the taxable year).
87. See I.R.C. § 441(d)-(e) (2006). Taxpayers may elect, under certain circumstances, a 5253 week taxable year that ends on the same day of week. See I.R.C. § 441(f) (2006). Accounting
periods of less than twelve months may result from a change in accounting period or in cases where
the taxpayer has not been existence for twelve months. See I.R.C. § 443(a) (2006). Individuals,
with rare exceptions, determine their income on a calendar year basis. Partnerships, S-corporations,
and personal service corporations have limited flexibility in the selection of their taxable years. See
generally I.R.C. §§ 441(i); 444; 706(b); 1378 (2006).
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amounts at a steadier pace.88 Likewise, a taxpayer who realizes capital
losses in some years and capital gains in other years is likely to be
disadvantaged when compared to a taxpayer who fortuitously realizes
losses during the same year that gains were realized.89 The current
economic predicament in which we find ourselves has brought to light
the tax disadvantages of earning large amounts of income over many
years, followed by a year or two of extraordinarily large losses—a
situation that recent legislation has attempted to ameliorate.90
The centrality of the annual accounting principle is evidenced by
the federal income tax treatment of transactions that are subsequently
rescinded. 91 Rescission may be effectuated pursuant to contract

88. Taxpayers who enjoy a few years of very high earnings may be at an advantage with
respect to payroll taxes, specifically old-age, survivors, and disability income tax obligations. Such
obligations are limited to certain income thresholds that are adjusted annually for inflation. See
generally I.R.C. §§ 3101(a); 3121(a)(1) (2006).
89. I.R.C. § 1211(a) limits corporations from deducting capital losses in excess of capital
gains, and I.R.C. § 1211(b) limits non-corporate taxpayers to deductible capital losses of $3,000 in
excess of capital gains. Corporate capital losses may, in general, be carried back three years and
forward five years. I.R.C. §§ 1212(a)(1)(A), 1212(a)(1)(B). Other taxpayers may carry forward
unused losses indefinitely, subject to the aforementioned $3,000 limitation. See I.R.C. § 1212(b)
(2006).
90. In general, net operating losses incurred in a taxable year may be carried back two years
and forward twenty years to offset taxable income in the year to which such losses are carried. 26
U.S.C.A. § 172(a)-(b)(1) (West 2009). An elective carry-back period, up to a maximum of five
years, has been provided for certain small businesses by the recently enacted stimulus legislation.
American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.111-5, § 1211, 123 Stat. 335
(2009) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 172(b)(1)(I)(i)). The value of unused net operating losses are often
a significant asset of companies targeted by suitors. See, e.g., Jesse Drucker & Matthew
Karnitschnig, The Lure of Sirius: Tax Losses, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2009, at B1 (discussing the
interest of suitors in Sirius XM Radio). Significant limitations are imposed on the ability to
acquiring corporations to use net operating losses generated by acquired corporations. See
generally I.R.C. § 382 (2006) (limiting the annual use of acquired net operating losses to the value
of the acquired corporation multiplied by an I.R.S. provided interest rate). The I.R.S. eased these
rules temporarily in late 2008 for acquisitions in the financial sector. See Notice 2008-83, 2008-42
I.R.B. 905 (Oct. 20, 2008). Whether the Internal Revenue Service had the authority to grant such
relief has been subject to considerable debate. See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Can Obama’s IRS
Retroactively Revoke Massive Bank Giveaway?, TAX NOTES, February 16, 2009, at 889. The
American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009 terminated this relief effective for ownership
changes occurring after January 16, 2009. Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1261, 123 Stat. 342-43 (2009).
91. Rescission is the voiding of a contract ab initio. Rescission is often confused with the
abandonment of a contract. However, abandonment of a contract discharges the injured party’s
obligation to perform under the contract but, for purposes of supporting a remedial right to damages,
the contract remains alive. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 528 (2009). A contract may also be
rescinded unilaterally by a party to the contract due to the existence of some legally sufficient
grounds such as mistake, duress, fraud, and the like. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 549 (2009).
Generally, a contract must be rescinded in total, but partial rescission may be allowed if the contract
in question is divisible. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 533 (2009). A party may not seek
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provisions or may occur as a result of a court decree.92 Transactions
may be rescinded for a number of reasons. For example, a transaction
that results in the issuance of corporate securities may be rescinded if the
issuance of securities jeopardizes the tax status of the issuer. The
conversion of a limited liability company or partnership into a
corporation in anticipation of an initial public offering may be unwound
if the initial public offering is shelved.93 Rescission may also be sought
as a remedy in an adversarial proceeding. In Penn v. Robertson,94
executives of the American Tobacco Company participated in a stock
purchase program under which the participants were able to purchase
stock in the company at prices below the stock’s fair market value. The
employees issued notes in payment for the stock, and the program
anticipated that the notes would be repaid from dividends and bonuses
the participants were to receive from the company.95 In the year
subsequent to the institution of the program, the entire arrangement was
rescinded in response to shareholder lawsuits alleging that the plan was
not duly authorized.96 The Fourth Circuit held that the income received
by the executives under the program in the year prior to rescission was
properly reported in that year.97 The income received in the year of
rescission and paid back to the company was not reportable as income,
however.98
The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that transactions will be
disregarded for tax purposes if the transaction is rescinded during the
same taxable year and the parties are returned to the status quo ante.99

rescission and damages for breach although such remedies may be alternatively pleaded. See
generally 25 AM. JUR. 2D Election of Remedies § 25 (2009).
92. Id.
93. The issuance of certain types of securities may cause the termination of a corporation’s
election to be taxed as an S-corporation. See I.R.C. § 1361(b) (2006). Publicly traded partnerships,
with certain exceptions, are taxed as corporations. Absent an election to be taxed as a corporation,
limited liability companies are taxed as partnerships. Consequently, from a tax standpoint, there is
little to be gained by retaining the partnership or limited liability company form if the entity’s
ownership interests are publicly traded. See generally I.R.C. § 7704 (2006); Treas. Reg. §
301.7701-3(b)(i) (2006). See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006-13-027 (March 31, 2006); I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 2005-33-002 (Aug. 19, 2005).
94. 115 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1940).
95. Id. at 170.
96. Id. at 171.
97. Id. at 174-75.
98. Id. at 175-76.
99. Rev. Rul. 80-58, 1980-1 C.B. 181. Section 1(b)(2)(C) of H.R. 1586, discussed supra note
25, created a legislative version of the rescission doctrine. The 90 percent tax imposed on
disqualified bonus payments would not have applied to bonus payments that were returned by the
employee before the close of the taxable year. Id.
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Consequently, transactions rescinded in a later year will not disturb the
tax consequences reported in tax years prior to the rescission.100 The
rescission doctrine has limited applicability to compensation clawbacks.
Typically, clawbacks do not arise from the rescission of a contract. To
the contrary, clawbacks may be triggered under the terms of the contract.
Penn v. Robertson may provide support for the position that
compensation that is returned in the same year that it was received need
not be reported as income.101 However, it is unlikely such situations will
arise with regularity.
In addition to the tax disparities that result from the timing of
income that is earned over an extended period, the annual accounting
concept can also create anomalies on a transactional basis. Quite often,
the profitability of routine transactions cannot be determined with
certainty during a taxable year.102 For example, the ultimate profitability
of a sales transaction will not be known until the receivable generated by
the sale is collected or the warranty period applicable to the item sold
has expired.103 Cash-method taxpayers must recognize prepaid income
at the time of its receipt despite the fact that the taxpayer is obligated to
render services in a subsequent taxable year.104 In certain cases, the
statutes or regulations attempt to approximate the results that would be
attained in a transactional accounting system.105 In extremely rare

100. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-41-010 (Oct. 15, 1993).
101. See Penn v. Robertson, 115 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1940).
102. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
103. Certain accrual-basis taxpayers doing business in the fields of health, law, engineering,
architecture, accounting, actuarial science, performing arts, or consulting do not need to accrue
income that, on the basis of past experience, will not be collected. I.R.C. § 448(d)(3) (2006). Banks
and certain other financial institutions are permitted to reserve for loan losses. See I.R.C. §§ 585;
593 (2006).
104. Accrual-basis taxpayers may also be required to report prepaid income in the year of
receipt. However, several exceptions are available to accrual-basis taxpayers that prevent this
result. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5 (2001) (providing an exception for advance payments
for goods); Rev. Proc. 2004-34, 2004-22 I.R.B. 991 (June 1, 2004) (modifying and superseding
Rev. Proc. 71-21, 1971-2 C.B. 549 to expand the scope of transactions for which taxpayers may
defer income from advance payments for services).
105. For example, regulations that implement the installment sales rules of I.R.C. § 453A
contain detailed provisions that govern the accounting of installment sales with contingent sales
prices. These regulations require the taxpayer’s basis in the property sold to be recovered under
various methods depending on whether a maximum sales price is stated, a fixed period of time is
stated, or whether neither a maximum price nor fixed period time is provided. In a similar vein, an
elaborate set of rules has been promulgated to deal with debt instruments with contingent interest
under the original issue discount rules. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 1.453A-1(c) (1994); 1.1275-4
(2004). Taxpayers accounting for long-term contracts under the percentage of completion method
may be required to pay interest if, after the contract is completed and all costs are known, the
taxpayer’s estimates of the percentage of the contract completed throughout the years was too low,
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circumstances, a taxpayer may keep a transaction open until it is
completed.106
B. Claim of Right Doctrine
1. Income Inclusion
The need to keep faith with the annual accounting concept led to
the judicially created claim-of-right of doctrine. This doctrine requires a
taxpayer to recognize income received under a claim of right despite the
fact that taxpayer may be obligated to return such income in the
future.107 This doctrine is founded on the premise that income must be
thereby resulting in a deferral of tax. See generally I.R.C. § 460(b)(2) (2006). The aforementioned
rules are not meant to be exhaustive, but merely indicative of the Internal Revenue Service’s
willingness to engage in transactional accounting when it believes the annual accounting system
provides taxpayers with an easy avenue to tax deferral. On occasion, however, transactional type
accounting does benefit taxpayers. See supra note 103 (noting that certain accrual basis taxpayers
do not have to accrue income for services that, based on experience, will go uncollected).
106. The open-transaction doctrine causes the tax consequences of a transaction to remain open
until subsequent events materialize that allow for the determination of the income generated from
the transaction. This doctrine has its most singular applicability in the context of contingent sales
transactions. The open-transaction doctrine had its genesis in the landmark case of Burnet v. Logan,
283 U.S. 404 (1931). In general, income from an open transaction will not be recognized until such
time as the proceeds received exceed the taxpayer’s basis in the property. The Internal Revenue
Service strongly resists the application of this doctrine and, over the years, has substantially
diminished its availability. For example, in the case of an installment sale with a contingent sales
price, the lack of a maximum sales price or fixed period of time under which payments are to be
received raises factual questions as to whether a sale has, in fact, occurred. If, after considering all
the facts and circumstances, a sale has indeed occurred, then the taxpayer will recover her tax basis
over a fifteen-year period. See Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(c)(4) (1994). In the event that the sale is
not subject to installment reporting, the Internal Revenue Service has made clear that opentransaction treatment is reserved for “those rare and extraordinary cases in which the fair market
value of the obligation cannot reasonably be ascertained.” Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(d)(2)(iii)
(1994). One commentator believes that the open transaction doctrine spawned the Arrowsmith
doctrine that is discussed at infra notes 153-164 and accompanying text. See Myron C. Grauer, The
Supreme Court’s Approach to Annual and Transactional Accounting for Income Taxes: A Common
Law Malfunction in a Statutory System?, 21 GA. L. REV. 329, 357-58 (1986). Ironically, the current
tax treatment of nonqualified stock options bears a strong resemblance to the open transaction
doctrine. In essence, the incidence of taxation is postponed from the date the options are granted
until the date such options are exercised. There is no principled reason why such options cannot be
valued at the date of grant. See generally Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options
and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973) (presenting the Black-Scholes model); JOHN
C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES, 194-207 (4th ed. 2000) (discussing the
binomial option pricing model). See also infra note 251 (citing to the recently issued accounting
standard that mandates the expensing of compensatory options at the time of grant). For a
discussion of the tax treatment of compensatory stock options see infra notes 252-254 and
accompanying text.
107. See infra note 109.
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determined at the close of a taxable year and that subsequent events are
disregarded.108 The claim-of-right doctrine was established in the
seminal case of North American Oil Consolidated Co. v. Burnet.109 In
that case, the taxpayer and the United States were embroiled in a dispute
regarding beneficial ownership and income from an oil field that the
taxpayer operated, but in which the government held legal title.110 A
receiver was appointed in 1916 to operate the property and hold the
income derived there from.111 A district court, in 1917, held in favor of
the taxpayer and the receiver thereby turned over the income to the
taxpayer in that year.112 The government appealed and the district
court’s decision was affirmed in 1920.113 Certiorari was denied in 1922.
The taxpayer asserted that the income received in 1917 was taxable in
1922, the year all litigation over the income terminated.114 The Internal
Revenue Service argued that the income was taxable in 1917, the year
the taxpayer received the income.115 The Supreme Court, holding for the
government, stated that:
[I]f a taxpayer received income under a claim of right and without
restriction as to its disposition, he has received income which he is
required to return, even though it may still be claimed that he is not
108. The irrelevance of subsequent events is premised on both doctrinal and practical
considerations. Doctrinally, the fact that the taxpayer has actual command over the property taxed
provides justification for taxation at that time. United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 591 (1951). In
addition, disregard of subsequent events avoids the administration burdens that would be imposed
upon the Internal Revenue Service if it had to determine the merits of taxpayers’ claims. See United
States v. Merrill, 211 F.2d 297, 304 (9th Cir. 1954).
109. 286 U.S. 417 (1932). The Court held that the claim-of-right doctrine applied regardless of
whether the taxpayer utilized the cash or accrual method of accounting. Id. at 423. The only
discernable difference in the application of the claim-of-right doctrine to cash- and accrual-basis
taxpayers appears to be the timing of the deduction in the event the income is required to be repaid.
Accrual-basis taxpayers are entitled to deduct the repaid income in the year it is properly accruable
under general tax accounting principles. The term “claim of right” was actually coined in an earlier
Sixth Circuit case. See Board v. Comm’r, 51 F.2d 73, 75 (6th Cir. 1931).
110. N. Am. Oil Consol., 286 U.S. at 420.
111. Id. at 421.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 420 (1932).
115. All references to the Internal Revenue Service include references to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, the former name of the agency. The official name of the agency was changed to the
Internal Revenue Service in 1953. See T.D. 6038, 1953-2 C.B. 443. The taxpayer argued that the
income was taxable either in 1916, the year the income was earned but retained by the receiver, or
in 1922, the year all litigation terminated. N. Am. Oil Consol., 286 U.S. at 422. The Court held that
the income was not taxable in 1916 because the taxpayer had not received the income in that year.
Id. at 423. It appears that the taxpayer was willing to incur tax on the income in 1916 because tax
rates were lower in 1916 than they were in 1917. See Grauer, supra note 106, at 351 n.65 (citing M.
CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION ¶10.02, at 205).
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entitled to retain the money, and even though he may still be adjudged
liable to restore its equivalent.116
In dicta, the Court stated that had the taxpayer been obliged to
return the income, it would have been entitled to a deduction in the year
the profits were returned and would not be entitled to amend a previous
year’s return.117 The Court had occasion to revisit this issue in United
States v. Lewis.118 In this case the taxpayer received a bonus in 1944.119
Two years later, the taxpayer, as a result of litigation, was required to
repay approximately one-half of the bonus to his employer.120 The
taxpayer sought a refund of taxes that he paid in 1944 but the Internal
Revenue Service contended that the repayment of the bonus was
deductible as a loss in 1946, the year it was repaid.121 The Court, citing
North American Oil, held for the government.122 Interestingly, the Court
had the opportunity to create an exception to the claim-of-right doctrine
for cases in which the statute of limitations for amending returns had not
run. In this case, the taxpayer had the ability to file an amended return.
The Court chose not to create such an exception.123 The Supreme Court
and lower courts have reaffirmed the claim-of-right doctrine on several
occasions and it “has become a firmly established principle of federal
income taxation.”124
116. N. Am. Oil Consol., 286 U.S. at 424. This doctrine requires that amounts be received
under a claim of right. The taxpayer must treat the income as hers. Therefore, the doctrine does not
apply to customer or client overpayments that are reflected as liabilities on the books of the
taxpayer. The doctrine does apply, however, to funds received by mistake, embezzlement, violation
of fiduciary duties, and breach of contract. See JAMES E. MAULE, GROSS INCOME: TAX BENEFIT,
CLAIM OF RIGHT AND ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME, 502-3rd TAX MGMT. (BNA 2007) A-26 - A-29.
The doctrine has not been applied to prepaid income. Id. at A-25. The taxation of prepaid income
is guided by general tax accounting principles and specific guidance has been issued by the Internal
Revenue Service with respect to such income. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
117. N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 424 (1932).
118. 340 U.S. 590 (1951).
119. Id. at 590.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 591.
122. Id. at 591-92.
123. Justice Douglas would have created such an exception. United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S.
590, 592 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
124. MAULE, supra note 116, at A-23. More than three-quarters of a century after its arrival,
the precise contours of this doctrine are not entirely clear. Commentators disagree whether the
doctrine is a tax accounting concept, created solely for the purpose of determining when income is
subject to tax, or a substantive rule of law that defines taxable income. The Supreme Court declined
to opine on this issue. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 216 n.7 (1961). Moreover, the
requirement that income be received under “claim of right” has been ignored in the case of ill-gotten
income. It is well-settled that funds obtained through embezzlement or theft are taxable under this
doctrine in the year of receipt, despite the fact that the wrongdoer has no cognizable claim to the
funds. See, e.g., id. at 219; Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 137 (1952). The Bernard Madoff
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The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Merrill,125created a limited
exception to the application of the claim-of-right doctrine. In that case, a
cash-method taxpayer erroneously received executor fees, discovered the
mistake in the year such fees were received, and acknowledged his
obligation to repay the fees.126 However, the fees were repaid in a later
year.127 The court held that the erroneous fees were not income in the
year of receipt and noted that the “harsh claim of right doctrine” should
not apply to taxpayers who, acting in good faith, acknowledge their
obligation to repay amounts in the year such amounts are received.128
The courts have generally limited the Merrill exception to situations
where the obligation to repay is unconditional, and the funds in question
were obtained by virtue of a mistake, as opposed to wrongdoing.129 The
Seventh Circuit has refused to apply the Merrill exception on the
grounds that Merrill predated the enactment of Section 1341, a provision

scandal raises some interesting issues with respect to application of this doctrine. Taxpayers who
actually received funds from Madoff that are required to be returned arguably will be ensnared by
the doctrine and will have to settle for deducting any repayments made in the year of repayment.
Investors who did not actually receive the phantom income that Madoff claimed to have generated
may be able to file amended returns for the years in which the statute of limitations has not run.
However, if the income that was reported to investors was subject to withdrawal by the investors
then, quite possibly, they were in constructive receipt of the income and the claim-of-right doctrine
may very well apply. Until more facts come to light regarding Madoff’s Ponzi scheme it is difficult
to draw conclusions as to the possible tax consequences for defrauded investors. The I.R.S. has
issued very favorable guidance with respect to the tax treatment of these losses. The I.R.S. has
ruled that losses incurred by investors are to be treated as theft losses related to a transaction entered
into for profit. Consequently, the loss is not subject to the 10 percent of adjusted gross income
reduction nor the per occurrence floor applicable to casualty and theft losses. Moreover, such losses
are not subject to the 2 percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions nor to the I.R.C. § 68
overall limitation on such deductions. Rev. Rul. 2009-9, 2009-14 I.R.B. 735 (March 17, 2009).
The I.R.S. has also provided safe harbors for determining the amount of the deduction. The safe
harbor applies only to investors who invested directly in the Ponzi scheme and not to those investors
who invested in the scheme indirectly—for example, through a fund of funds investment. Investors
not pursuing a recovery of funds from a third party may deduct 95 percent of their losses less any
recoveries from insurance providers or the Securities Investor Protection Corporation. Investors
pursuing claims against third parties may deduct 75 percent of their losses. Rev. Proc. 2009-20,
2009-14 I.R.B. 749 (March 17, 2009). For an excellent analysis of the inconsistencies in the
application of the claim-of-right doctrine - and the exceptions thereto—see Harold Dubroff, The
Claim-of-right doctrine, 40 TAX L. REV. 729, 738-47 (1985).
125. 211 F. 2d 297 (9th Cir. 1954).
126. Id. at 298-99.
127. Id. at 302.
128. Id. at 304.
129. See Hope v. Comm’r, 471 F.2d 738, 742 (3d Cir. 1973); Buff v. Comm’r, 496 F. 2d 847,
848 (2d Cir. 1974).
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intended to ameliorate the inequities that may result from the application
of the claim of right doctrine.130
The claim-of-right doctrine will prevent taxpayers whose income is
clawed back from amending prior years’ income tax returns. Any tax
benefits that result from the repayment or forfeiture of compensation
will be limited to those generated by a tax deduction in the year such
compensation is repaid or forfeited.
2. Deductibility of Repayments
a. In General
The corollary to the recognition of income received under a claim
of right is the deduction of the repayment of such income in a
subsequent tax year. Subject to various exceptions, the tax code limits
deductions to expenditures or losses incurred in a trade or business or in
connection with an activity entered into for profit. Section 162(a) states
that “[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred in carrying on any trade or business
. . . .”131 In the case of individuals, losses are also deductible if such
losses are incurred in a trade or business.132 The distinction between an
expense and a loss is not entirely clear, but whether a compensation
repayment is classified as an expense or a loss should be of little
practical consequence.133 Whether a taxpayer is engaged in the carrying

130. Quinn v. Comm’r, 524 F. 2d 617, 625 (7th Cir. 1975). Section 1341 was enacted in 1954.
For a detailed analysis of this provision see infra notes 174-196 and accompanying text. The
Seventh Circuit’s rationale appears harsh. Not all amounts received by cash basis taxpayers are
income—cash advances under a credit card arrangement, for example. Likewise, if an individual
mistakenly receives a payment that is clearly meant for another person and that fact is known to the
recipient upon receipt then no income is realized. The fact that the recipient discovers the mistake
in the same tax year, but not immediately upon receipt, hardly seems to justify treating the receipt of
such funds as income. The rescission doctrine, discussed at supra notes 91-100 and accompanying
text, requires the transaction and its rescission to occur in the same tax year. However, the
circumstances to which Merrill putatively applies do not involve the unwinding of a contractual
arrangement or legal status under which the recipient originally obtained the funds in question. Id.
131. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2006).
132. I.R.C. § 165(c)(1) (2006). A variety of expenses and losses are deductible that do not
arise in a trade or a business or in activities carried on for profit. For example, interest expense on
debt secured by a mortgage on a personal residence, state and local realty or income taxes, casualty
and theft losses, charitable contributions, medical expenses, and alimony are deductible. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. §§ 163(h)(2)(D); 164(a)(1)-(2); 165(c)(3); 170; 213; 215 (2006).
133. Most tax practitioners would classify expenditures made without a concomitant benefit or
the disposition of property for less than its tax basis as losses. One court described the distinction
between losses and expenses as “self-evident.” Holt v. Comm’r, 69 T.C.75, 78 (1977). However, it
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on of a trade or business is a factual question. Trade or business status
requires the existence of a profit motive and the engagement of regular
and considerable levels of activity with respect to the enterprise.134 The
rendering of services as an employee is considered the carrying on of a
trade or business.135 Whether an expense is ordinary depends on the
facts and circumstances and not whether an expense is recurrent in
nature.136
An expenditure is deemed necessary if such expenditure is
appropriate and helpful.137 Thus, although an expenditure that is
essential to the business would easily pass muster under this standard,
deductibility does not turn on whether an expenditure is deemed
essential.138 It is not necessary for the expenditure to have been
compelled, either contractually or otherwise, but voluntary expenditures
have met with mixed results.139 With respect to compensation
repayments, whether such repayments are considered necessary appear
to turn, in large part, on whether the repayments were compelled, by law
is often difficult to make a principled distinction between expenses and losses. See Fed’n Bank &
Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 27 T.C. 960 (1975) (holding that a bank’s payments to settle depositor claims
were deductible as either expenses or losses).
134. See Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987). The issue of whether the taxpayer
has a profit motive may be a significant issue for individual taxpayers. If the activity is found to
lack a profit motive then deductions attributable to such an activity are limited to the gross income
derived from the activity. These so-called hobby loss rules contain a presumption that an activity is
engaged in for profit if the activity generates net income for a certain number of years in a defined
testing period. See generally I.R.C. § 183 (2006).
.
135. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-17(a) (1990). A significant number of disputes arise over the status
of investment activities. The Supreme Court, in Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 217-218,
reh’g. denied, 312 U.S. 714 (1941), held that the taxpayer’s activities in managing a large securities
portfolio did not rise to the level of a trade or business. The assets in question were financial assets
that entitled the taxpayer to income but gave him neither the right to participate in managing the
operations of a business nor any liability exposure beyond his investment. Id. at 215. Under
Higgens, direct ownership of property, with its concomitant right to management and exposure to
liability, is required for trade or business status. For example, real estate holdings may or may not
represent a trade or business. Speculative holdings in raw land for eventual sale, rental real estate
subject to long-term net leases, and royalty interests in natural resources, probably would not rise to
the level of a trade or business. See Pinchot v. Comm’r., 113 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1940); Rev. Rul. 73522, 1973-2 C.B. 226 (1973).
136. See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933). Generally speaking, if, under the
circumstances, an expense would typically be incurred, it would be considered ordinary despite the
fact that the circumstances surrounding the expenditure would not be expected to occur with
regularity—law suits, for example.
137. See id. at 113.
138. See infra note 139.
139. Compare Levy v. Comm’r, 30 T.C. 1315 (1958) (holding that voluntary payments made
by an agent to a performer were deductible) with Friedman v. Delaney, 171 F.2d 269 (1st Cir. 1948)
(denying a deduction for voluntary payments made by an attorney to his clients to mitigate losses
incurred partly as a result of the attorney’s advice).
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or agreement, or were voluntary.140 In closely-held corporations,
compensation repayments by shareholder-employees are not that
unusual and are typically triggered by the Internal Revenue Service’s
assertion that the compensation in question was unreasonable and,
therefore, not deductible.141 In such circumstances, the employee is also
a shareholder and the compensation may be repaid despite the fact that a
clawback provision is absent from the employment contract and the
corporate by-laws.142 Voluntary repayments of this sort have also not
fared well under Section 1341, discussed subsequently.143
If the expenditure or loss is incurred in connection with an activity
that does not rise to the level of a trade or business, then an expense or
loss deduction is nonetheless available if the expenditure was incurred
for the production or collection of income or if the loss was incurred in
an activity engaged in for profit.144 Otherwise, no deduction is available
unless the expense or loss falls within another statutory provision.145
The deductibility of amounts repaid may be denied if the amount
originally received under a claim of right was not subject to tax. In
general, this issue arises in cases where the amounts repaid were tax

140. See generally United States v. Simon, 281 F.2d 520, 526 (6th Cir. 1960); Blanton v,
Comm’r, 46 T.C. 527 (1966), aff’d. per curiam 379 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1967); Rev. Rul. 69-115,
1969-1 C.B. 50.
141. Compensation is deductible to the extent it is reasonable. In closely held corporations
high-ranking officers are typically shareholders. Excessive compensation may be re-characterized
as a dividend for which no deduction is available to the corporation. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1627(1958); 1.162-8 (1958). Consequently, the corporate by-laws or the terms of an employment
agreement may require compensation, found by the Internal Revenue Service to be excessive, to be
repaid. Similar requirements are also found with respect to compensation that may be classified as a
golden parachute. Golden-parachute payments are payments made to officers, shareholders, or
highly compensated employees made as a result of a change in control of the corporation and that
exceed certain thresholds. Such payments are not deductible. See generally I.R.C. § 280G (2006).
142. Arguably, a voluntary repayment by employees in a publicly traded corporation made to
retain employment would have a much better chance of meeting the “necessary” requirement than
repayments made by employees who were also controlling shareholders of the employer. Several
Nortel executives voluntarily repaid compensation after prior year earnings of the company were
restated. See Anne Newman, Giving Back the Bonus, BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 24, 2005, at 44.
143. See infra notes 174-196 and accompanying text.
144. See I.R.C. §§ 212(1); 165(c)(2) (2006). Section 212, like § 162, contains the “ordinary
and necessary” requirement for deductible expenses. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. If
the activity is found to lack a profit motive, then deductions attributable to the activity are limited to
the gross income derived from the activity. These so-called hobby loss rules contain a presumption
that an activity is engaged in for profit if the activity generates net income for a certain number of
years in a defined testing period. See generally I.R.C. § 183 (2006).
145. Numerous deductions are allowed without regard to whether the expenditures or losses are
incurred in a trade or business or in profit-making activity. Among the more common such items
are mortgage interest, real estate and income taxes, casualty and theft losses, charitable
contributions, and medical expenses. See generally I.R.C. §§ 163; 164; 165; 170; 213 (2006).
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exempt, such as gifts146 or the proceeds of a life insurance policy,147 or in
cases where the funds received were not reported as income—a not
infrequent occurrence with respect to income from illegal activities.
Various justifications for the denial of deductions for repayments of such
amounts have been put forth, including consistency, equity, lack of tax
basis, and tax-benefit analysis.148 It is doubtful that this issue will
regularly arise with respect to the repayment of compensation.149 As
subsequently discussed, forfeited compensation that was not previously
includable in income typically will not implicate claim-of-right issues.150
In such cases, the forfeited income was not realized and, therefore, was
not income at all. Consequently, the forfeiture of such income is not a
taxable event.
A related issue—the character of the deduction—is likely to arise
with some regularity. It is quite possible that clawback provisions
encompass any gains generated by the sale or exchange of employer
securities that were taxed at favorable capital-gain rates.151 Deductions
attributable to the repayment of such gains will be treated as capital
losses, subject to the limitations applicable to such losses.152 The

146. See I.R.C. § 102(a) (2006).
147. See I.R.C. § 101(a)(1) (2006).
148. See Buras v. Comm’r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1311 (1977); Shipley v. United States, 608 F.2d
770, 773 (9th Cir. 1979). Lack of basis is generally used to support the denial of losses, under
I.R.C. § 165, whereas the other justifications tend to support the denial of deductions under I.R.C.
§§ 162 and 212. The Supreme Court limited, on equitable grounds, a taxpayer’s deduction
attributable to refunds of customer overcharges because the overcharges generated a related
depletion deduction that was determined as a percentage of gross receipts. United States v. Skelly
Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 680 (1969). Skelly Oil should be limited to situations in which the income
item in question triggers a specific deduction and should not apply broadly to cases where the
income items generated no additional tax because the taxpayer was in an overall loss position. See,
e.g., O’Meara v. Comm’r, 8 T.C. 622, 633-35 (1947). For an excellent analysis of Skelly see Joel
Rabinovitz, Effects of Prior Year’s Transactions on Federal Income Tax Consequences of Current
Receipts or Payments, 28 TAX L. REV. 85 (1972).
149. If property is forfeited, then the deductible loss would be limited to the tax basis of the
property to the employee at the time of forfeiture. For example, if employer stock is required to be
returned to the employer, then the employer’s loss is limited to the basis of the stock and not the fair
market value of the stock at the time of forfeiture. Arguably, this limitation arises from the
application of I.R.C. § 1001, which provides that gain or loss on the sale or other disposition of
property is determined by reference to the amount realized on such sale or disposition and the
taxpayer’s basis in the property sold or disposed, and not from the application of judicially
developed equitable doctrines. See infra notes 235-259 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the tax treatment of compensation paid in the form of property.
150. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
151. Such gains are within the scope of § 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. See supra
note 38 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 153-168 and accompanying text.
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seminal case that mandates such a result is Arrowsmith v.
Commissioner.153
At issue in Arrowsmith was the characterization of payments made
by the former shareholders of a corporation, since liquidated, to satisfy a
judgment against the corporation.154
Several years earlier, the
shareholders had received liquidating distributions that were taxed at
favorable capital gain rates.155 Had the corporation satisfied the
judgment prior to its liquidation, the shareholders would have received
less in liquidation and, therefore, reported a smaller capital gain.156 The
shareholders treated the payments in the later year as an ordinary loss
because the payments did not result from a sale or exchange, a
requirement for capital gain or loss treatment.157 The Third Circuit had
recently accepted this argument in a similar case.158 The Second Circuit
held, however, that the annual accounting principle did not preclude the
examination of the treatment of the transaction in prior years for
purposes of characterizing the current year’s transaction.159 Because the
payment of the judgment was integrally related to the prior liquidation
transaction, the character of the income from the original transaction
should govern the character of the later deduction. The Supreme Court
affirmed the Second Circuit and noted that the decision did no violence
to the annual accounting principle because it did not require the
reopening of prior tax years.160
The scope of the Arrowsmith doctrine has been the subject of
debate.161 The Court in Skelley Oil, discussed above, cited to
Arrowsmith in support of its holding limiting a deduction because the
income to which it related was not fully subject to tax.162 Arrowsmith,
however, was strictly a characterization issue and did not concern itself
with the amount of the item in question—a point noted by Justice
Stewart in dissent.163 Despite the uncertainty about whether Arrowsmith
153. 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
154. Id. at 7-8.
155. Id. at 7.
156. Id.
157. Capital gain or loss treatment results from the sale or exchange of a capital asset. See
I.R.C. § 1222 (2006).
158. See Comm’r v. Switlik, 184 F.2d 299, 302 (3d Cir. 1950).
159. 193 F.2d 734, 735 (2d Cir. 1951).
160. Arrowsmith v. Comm’r, 344 U.S. 6, 8-9 (1952).
161. See infra note 163 and accompanying text; Rabinovitz, supra note 148, at 87-88.
162. United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 685 (1969).
163. Id. at 697-98 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The taxpayers had paid tax on their previously
reported capital gains in full, but at a favorable rate. Id. at 698 n.6. Therefore, unlike Skelly Oil, the
income was subject to tax in full. The Court in Skelly Oil did make note of this fact, and admitted
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should be extended to cases where the amount of the deduction is in
question, its application in characterizing a deduction is not in dispute.164
Finally, regardless of the level of employee culpability, the
deductibility of compensation repayments pursuant to a clawback
agreement should be circumvented neither by the application of I.R.C.
section 162(f) nor by resort to some public policy rationale.165 Section
162(f) disallows a deduction for any fine or similar penalty paid “to a
government for the violation of any law.”166 Therefore, amounts paid
pursuant to a clawback provision that are remitted to the employer are
outside the scope of section 162(f). Moreover, the legislative history of
this provision indicates that its passage was intended, in part, to restrain
the courts from determining that certain deductions should be denied on
public policy grounds.167
that a better analogy would have been drawn had the taxpayers elected, as they were permitted to do
under existing law, to exclude fifty percent of the capital gains and forego the favorable capital gain
tax rate. Id. at 685 n.4. Moreover, the Court went on to state that Arrowsmith stood for the
proposition that “if money was taxed at a special lower rate when received, the taxpayer would be
accorded an unfair tax windfall if repayments were generally deductible from receipts taxable at the
higher rate applicable to ordinary income.” Id. at 685. In actuality, Arrowsmith did not limit the
amount of the deduction to account for the lower tax rate applicable to the income to which the
deduction related. See Arrowsmith v. Comm’r, 344 U.S. 6, 8-9 (1952); United States v. Skelly Oil
Co., 394 U.S. 678, 698 n.6 (1969) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Instead, it gave the deduction the same
character as the income and thereby subjected it to separate rules limiting capital loss deductions.
See id. For a critique of an expansive reading of Arrowsmith, see Rabinovitz, supra note 148, at 8788.
164. The Second and Ninth Circuits had earlier rendered decisions in cases where a capitalgain transaction generated additional income in subsequent years. Part of the proceeds received in
the original transactions had unascertainable values. The subsequent proceeds, if viewed in
isolation, would not qualify for capital gains treatment because they did not arise from a sale or
exchange in the year they were received. Both courts held that the income received in later years
was capital gain based on the character of the original transaction. See Comm’r v. Carter, 170 F.2d
911 (2d Cir. 1948); Westover v. Smith, 173 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1949). Although these cases are often
considered “open transaction” cases the courts’ decisions on the character of the income is closely
related to the later promulgated Arrowsmith doctrine. See supra note 106 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the open transaction doctrine.
165. I.R.C. § 162(f) (2006).
166. Id. (emphasis added).
167. S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 274 (1969). The Supreme Court, prior to the enactment of section
162(f), held that fines paid by a trucking firm to a state for violations of vehicle weight rules were
not deductible. See Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Comm’r, 356 U.S. 30 (1958). Judicial
determinations that the deductibility of certain expenditures would run counter to some public
policy were often inconsistent and unpredictable. See generally James W. Colliton, The Tax
Treatment of Criminal and Disapproved Payments, 9 VA. TAX REV. 273, 275-76 (1989).
Deductions have been allowed in various settings that would seemingly raise objections on public
policy grounds. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 82-74, 1982-1 C.B. 110 (allowing a deductible loss for
restitution payments made by an arsonist); Rev. Rul. 65-254, 1965-2 C.B. 50 (allowing a deduction
for the return of embezzled funds). It appears that the Internal Revenue Service and the courts have
foregone any resort to broad public policy rationales in denying deductions for payments made in
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Repayments of compensation should have little trouble navigating
the statutory requirements for deductibility. However, in many cases, if
not most, the tax benefit that results from the deduction will not yield the
benefit that would have been obtained had the compensation income
reported in an earlier year been reduced. In addition to the possibility
that the tax rates to which the taxpayer is subject may have changed
between the year of income recognition and the year of the reported
deduction, the tax code places a number of restrictions on deductions.168
For example, an individual’s deduction for repaid compensation would
be classified as a miscellaneous itemized deduction, deductible only to
the extent such deductions exceed two percent of adjusted gross income
and would be subject to phase-out based on the taxpayer’s income
level.169 Moreover, miscellaneous itemized deductions may not provide
much, if any, benefit if the taxpayer is subject to the alternativeminimum tax.170 In fact, a significant level of such deductions may
trigger the application of this tax. 171 If, under Arrowsmith, the
deduction is considered a capital loss, it is deductible only to the extent
of capital gains plus $3,000.172 Any excess loss is available for

restitution and instead have allowed I.R.C. § 162(f) to establish the parameters of public policy in
this respect. In other settings, equitable doctrines may have vitality. See Craig M. Boise, Playing
with “Monopoly Money”: Phony Profits, Fraud, Penalties, and Equity, 90 MINN. L. REV. 144
(2005). On occasion, deductions related to an activity are categorically denied. See I.R.C. § 280E
(2006) (denying any deduction or credit for amounts paid or incurred in carrying on the trade or
business of narcotics trafficking).
168. It is possible, of course, that the individual is subject to higher marginal tax rates in the
year of repayment, thereby, all things being equal, rendering the deduction more valuable.
169. I.R.C. §§ 67(a); 68 (2006). Trade or business expenses are deductible in arriving at
adjusted gross income. However, trade or business expenses incurred by an employee are
deductible only from adjusted gross income as itemized deductions. I.R.C. § 62(a)(1) (2006).
Certain exceptions are provided for employee business expenses but none are relevant to repaid
compensation. See I.R.C. § 62(a)(2) (2006). Miscellaneous itemized deductions are defined as all
itemized deductions other than those specifically excepted. Repaid compensation does not fall
within one of the enumerated exceptions. See I.R.C. § 67(b) (2006). Section 68 may cause up to 80
percent of miscellaneous itemized deductions to be lost depending on the level of the taxpayer’s
adjusted gross income. I.R.C. § 68(a) (2006).
170. The alternative-minimum tax is a tax imposed on an expanded tax base. The tax is
imposed only if it exceeds the tax liability of the taxpayer determined under regular tax rules and
only on the amount of such excess. Generally speaking, this tax is designed to limit the ability of
taxpayers to utilize certain statutory tax benefits to minimize their tax liability. See generally I.R.C.
§§ 55-59 (2006). Miscellaneous itemized deductions are not deductible in computing the
alternative-minimum tax. I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i) (2006). A detailed discussion of this tax is
beyond the scope of this work. This tax has particular relevance with respect to incentive stock
options. See infra notes 274-278 and accompanying text.
171. I.R.C. § 1211(b) (2006).
172. Id.
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carryover to succeeding tax years and is subject to this limitation in each
successive year.173
b. Section 1341
Congress enacted Section 1341 in 1954 in an effort to mitigate the
potential inequities that may arise from the strict adherence to the annual
accounting principle.174 Section 1341 provides that the tax benefit
resulting from the deduction for the return of previously taxed income
will at least equal the reduction in tax that would have resulted had the
income reported in a previous year or years been excluded from
income.175 In effect, Section 1341 attempts to place the taxpayer in the
same position she would have been in had the return for a previous year
or years been amended.176
Section 1341 imposes three requirements.177 First, an item must
have been included in gross income for a prior taxable year because it
appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to such income.178

173. 26 U.S.C.A. § 1212(b) (West 2009).
174. See H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 4025-26 (1954).
175. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(4)-(5) (2006). If the tax benefit of the deduction in the year of repayment
exceeds the benefit resulting from the exclusion of the income in a prior year or years, the taxpayer
is entitled to the benefit of the current deduction. Id.
176. If the exclusion of income from a prior year causes a net operating loss, then the decrease
in tax resulting from the exclusion is determined by carrying back and forward the loss pursuant to
I.R.C. § 172. I.R.C. § 1341(b)(4)(B) (2006). However, the parallel to filing an amended return is
not complete. Any refund of tax due as a result of the exclusion of income from a prior year is
considered to be a refund of taxes paid in the current year. I.R.C. § 1341(b)(1) (2006).
177. Section 1341 is inapplicable to deductions that relate to income resulting from the sale of
inventory with exceptions for certain refunds or rebates made by regulated utilities with respect to
rates. I.R.C. § 1341(b)(2) (2006). Likewise, this section is applicable neither to deductions
attributable to bad debts nor to deductions attributable to legal fees and other expenses incurred by
the taxpayer in contesting the restoration of an item previously included in income. Treas. Reg. §
1.1341-1(g)-(h) (1996).
178. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2006). A recent case involved the application of I.R.C. § 1341 to
deductions that the taxpayer asserted should have been deducted in prior years. Section 1341 is
limited to income received under a claim of right. Alcoa incurred waste disposal expenses during
the period 1940-1987 and included those costs in its cost of goods sold calculation. Alcoa, Inc. v.
United States, 509 F.3d 173, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2007). In 1993 Alcoa incurred substantial
environmental cleanup costs pursuant to various statutes, including the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980. Id. at 175. Alcoa, in a novel
argument, asserted that the cleanup costs incurred in 1993 should have been part of the cost of
goods sold during the 1940-1987 period. Id. at 179 n.6. Costs of goods sold are deducted from
gross receipts to arrive at gross income. Consequently, Alcoa argued that the failure to take the
deductions in earlier years resulted in additional income subject to tax. Id. at 179. If the costs were
reported in such period, Alcoa would have received greater tax benefits from the deductions than
those it would have obtained by deducting such costs in the year incurred, 1993. Id. As a result,
Alcoa argued it was entitled to the benefits of I.R.C. § 1341. Alcoa, Inc. v. United States, 509 F.3d
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Second, a deduction must be allowable in the taxable year because it was
established, after the close of the prior taxable year, that the taxpayer did
not, in fact, have an unrestricted right to all or a portion of the income.179
Finally, the deduction must exceed $3,000.180
The requirement that the taxpayer have an apparent unrestricted
right to the income in the year of receipt precludes the applicability of
Section 1341 to deductions arising from the repayment of embezzled
funds or from the repayment of income received as a result of arithmetic
errors in billing. 181 In neither case does the taxpayer have an apparent
right to the income—they have no right to the income at all. The
Internal Revenue Service’s position is that a taxpayer cannot have an
apparent right to income obtained by fraudulent means but judicial
guidance on this issue has been somewhat inconsistent.182 As discussed
subsequently, the requirement that a taxpayer have an apparent right to
income precludes, in most cases, the application of Section 1341 to the
forfeiture of income that was previously taxed as a result of the taxpayer
making an I.R.C. § 83(b) election.183
At the other end of spectrum, Section 1341 is unavailable for
deductions attributable to restorations of income for which the taxpayer
had an actual, as opposed to an apparent, right.184 If the obligation to
restore income arises from a subsequent transaction, then the taxpayer’s
right to income may be deemed absolute at the time of its receipt. For
example, a taxpayer was not entitled to the benefits of Section 1341 for a
deduction attributable to the refund of prepaid interest that was required

173, 179-80 (3d Cir. 2007). The Third Circuit denied Alcoa’s claim and held that, in order for
I.R.C. § 1341 to apply, the repayment must arise from the same circumstances, terms, and
conditions as the original item. Id.
179. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(2) (2006).
180. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(3) (2006).
181. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-153, 1968-1 C.B. 371, 373; McKinney v. United States, 574 F.2d
1240 (5th Cir. 1978); Yerkie v. Comm’r, 67 T.C. 388, 392 (1976). See also Perez v. United States,
553 F. Supp. 558, 561 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (holding that I.R.C. § 1341 was not applicable to
repayments of illegal kickbacks).
182. See Charlie Boer, The Right Intention but the Wrong Result: The Misapplication of
Section 1341 in Cooper v. United States, 59 TAX LAW. 1109 (2006) (discussing Cooper v. United
States in which the court refused to impute taxpayer wrongdoing to a trustee in bankruptcy); Jessica
K. Blosser & David W. Freeland, Pro-Taxpayer Decision on Claim-of-Right Relief, 36 TAX
ADVISER 197 (2005) (describing the Court of Federal Claims allowance of I.R.C. § 1341 for
deductions attributable to price fixing settlement payments); William L. Raby, Taxpayer
Repayments and the Tax Benefit Rule, 97 TAX NOTES 1183 (2002) (noting the Tax Court’s refusal
to establish a per se disallowance of I.R.C. § 1341 in the case of repayments of illegal income).
183. See infra notes 286-289 and accompanying text.
184. See generally I.R.C. § 1341.
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because the loan to which the interest related was prepaid.185 The
regulatory denial of Section 1341 for bad-debt expenses manifests this
position.186 The Internal Revenue Service has not been consistent in its
position with respect to repayment liabilities triggered by subsequent
events. On the one hand, it has argued that Section 1341 is inapplicable
to repayments of compensation if the obligation to repay the
compensation was triggered by a subsequent finding that the
compensation expense was not deductible by the employer—a position
with which the Sixth Circuit disagrees.187 On the other hand, the
Internal Revenue Service has allowed the use of Section 1341 with
respect to commissions repaid as a result of the subsequent failure of
customers to pay for the sales on which the commissions were earned.188
A host of issues may arise with respect to the applicability of
Section 1341 to repayments of compensation pursuant to a contractual
clawback provision. Repayments pursuant to retroactive clawback
provisions whose reach extend to periods antedating the agreement may
not be eligible for Section 1341 treatment—at least with respect to
compensation earned prior to the execution of the agreement.189 A
strong case can be made for the fact that, at the time of its receipt, the
taxpayer had more than an apparent right to the income. If a clawback is
triggered by a restatement of earnings and the taxpayer had a hand in
fraudulently reporting the earnings then, arguably, the taxpayer had no
right, apparent or otherwise, to the income.190 Difficult questions are
also posed by clawback provisions that are triggered with the benefit of
hindsight, but that do not result in restatements. For example, if income
must be restored because of subsequent losses or because it is found that
the taxpayer took undue risk, then it is unclear whether Section 1341
should apply. It is arguable that, at the time the compensation was
received, the taxpayer had more than an apparent right to the income and
the triggering of the clawback was precipitated by subsequent events.
185. Rev. Rul. 58-226, 1958-1 C.B. 318. See also supra note 178 (discussing a recent case,
Alcoa, Inc. v. United States, 509 F.3d. 173 (3d Cir. 2007), in which the Third Circuit denied the
taxpayer the benefit of I.R.C. § 1341 for environmental remediation costs).
186. See supra note 177.
187. See Rev. Rul. 69-115, 1969-1 C.B. 50; Rev. Rul. 67-437, 1967-2 C.B. 296; Van Cleave v.
United States, 718 F. 2d 193, 197 (6th Cir. 1983). See supra note 141 for a discussion of
repayments due to the Internal Revenue Service’s denial of a corporate deduction for compensation
payments.
188. Rev. Rul. 72-78, 1972-1 C.B. 45.
189. See Blanton v. Comm’r, 46 T.C. 527 (1966).
190. The application of accounting standards often requires the exercise of judgment. Proving
that a taxpayer intentionally inflated earnings rather than encountered a bout of undue optimism
may be quite difficult.
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This position is probably strongest in the case a clawback is triggered by
subsequent losses. It is certainly plausible that a clawback triggered by a
determination that the taxpayer undertook undue risk rendered the right
to the compensation more apparent than real. Presumably, the undue
risk was taken in the same year that the compensation was earned
despite the fact that the determination of the presence of such risk was
made subsequently. The uncertainty surrounding the application of
Section 1341 places executives who forfeit compensation that has not
been subject to tax in a favorable position when compared to those
executives who are forced to disgorge previously taxed compensation.
Section 1341 also requires that a deduction must be allowable to the
taxpayer in the taxable year because it was established, after the close of
the prior taxable year, that the taxpayer did not, in fact, have an
unrestricted right to all or a portion of the income.191 Section 1341 does
not create independent grounds for deducting an expense or loss.192
However, provided the repayment is involuntary, little difficulty should
arise in finding independent grounds for the deductibility of
compensation repayments.193 Moreover, the deductibility of repayments
should be unaffected by the wrongdoing, or lack thereof, of the taxpayer
in receiving the income in question.194
Section 1341 is a fail-safe provision for taxpayers. In the event a
current tax deduction yields greater tax benefits in the year of repayment
under standard tax rules, the taxpayer is entitled to those benefits and is
not limited to the benefits that would have arisen had the income been
excluded in the year it was recognized. Whether Section 1341 is
beneficial depends on the taxpayer’s particular circumstances in both the
year of income recognition and the year of repayment. However,
repayments of significant amounts of compensation will likely cause the
taxpayer to seek refuge in Section 1341. As previously discussed,
various limitations on itemized deductions and the application of the
alternative-minimum tax may dramatically reduce the value of the tax

191. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
192. Although the statutory language is relatively clear, the regulations unambiguously lead to
this conclusion. Section 1341 will apply only “[i]f, during the taxable year, the taxpayer is entitled
under other provisions of Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code to a deduction of more than
$3,000 . . . .” Treas. Reg. § 1.1341-1(a)(1) (1996) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has
similarly interpreted Section 1341. See United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 683 (1969)
(stating that “the use of the words ‘a deduction’ and the placement of § 1341 in subchapter Q—the
subchapter dealing largely with side effects of the annual accounting system—make it clear that it is
necessary to refer to other portions of the Code to discover how much of a deduction is allowable”).
193. See supra notes 131-142 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 165-167 and accompanying text.
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deduction in relation to the amount of tax imposed on the income in an
earlier year.195 Moreover, in the event the income restored was capital in
nature, the Arrowsmith doctrine may reduce the benefit of the deduction
to insignificance.196 In the current economic environment, taxpayers
with healthy amounts of capital gains are likely to be few and far
between.
The extent to which repaid compensation is deductible and the
nature of the deduction is dependent upon the original tax treatment of
the compensation income which has been clawed back. Likewise, the
benefit of Section 1341 is similarly dependent. Section 1341 yields a
benefit that mirrors the original tax incurred on the income in question.
The taxation of performance-based compensation is highly dependent on
the form of such compensation. Significant differences in the timing of
income recognition and the character of the income will result in
concomitant differences in the deductions available upon repayment.
C. Taxation of Performance-Based Compensation
The tax consequences of performance-based compensation that has
been subject to clawback will depend, to a great extent, on the tax
consequences to the employee upon the receipt of the compensation.
Performance-based compensation is payable either in cash or property.
Compensation payable in cash generally takes the form of a cash bonus
or stock appreciation rights. Bonus payments are usually, but not
always, determined on the basis of pre-defined metrics that vary
depending on the nature of the employer’s business and the incentives
which such employer seeks to put in place. Commonly employed
metrics include firm- or unit-wide measures such as return on equity, net
earnings, market share, sales growth, and the like. Metrics that focus on
individual or group performance are also prevalent.197
Stockappreciation rights determine compensation based on the growth of the
firm’s stock price between the date such rights are granted and the date
such rights are exercised.198 Property-based compensation arrangements
typically grant employees employer stock or options to purchase

195. See supra notes 168-173 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 151-164 and accompanying text.
197. Performance-based compensation is not subject to the $1 million limit on the deductibility
of certain executive compensation. See infra note 250 and accompanying text.
198. Stock appreciation rights may also credit the employee with dividends that are paid on the
stock.
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employer stock.199 The tax issues incident to cash compensation
arrangements are generally limited to the timing of the employee’s
income inclusion. The receipt of employer stock or options on such
stock raise additional issues.
1. Cash Compensation
Performance-based compensation payable in cash is taxable to the
recipient in the year such compensation is actually or constructively
received.200 Income is constructively received by a taxpayer if such
income is credited to her account, set apart for her, or otherwise made
available to be drawn upon without substantial limitations or
restrictions.201 It is not uncommon for employers to defer all or a
portion of the incentive compensation or, alternatively, to offer the
recipients the option to defer all or a portion of such compensation. The
specifics of the deferral arrangements vary from firm to firm, but
generally deferral arrangements provide specific timeframes under

199. The term “employer stock” includes stock of the parent corporation in cases where the
employees are employed by a controlled subsidiary of the parent.
200. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (1999). It is assumed that the employee utilizes the cash-basis of
method of accounting. Id. The cash basis method of accounting is used by virtually all individuals.
Self-employed individuals may elect, or be required to, utilize the accrual method of accounting for
their business operations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(2)(i) (2006) (mandating accrual accounting
for purchases and sales if the taxpayer maintains an inventory). Individuals may also recognize
income on the accrual basis by virtue of reporting their share of partnership income if such
partnership utilizes the accrual method of accounting. See generally I.R.C. §§ 702; 703(b) (2006).
Under the accrual method of accounting, income is recognized at the time all the events have
occurred that fix the right to receive such income and the amount thereof can be determined with
reasonable accuracy. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (1999). The employer, in most instances, will be an
accrual-basis taxpayer. Therefore, the employer’s compensation deduction may be accrued at the
time various statutory tests are met. In general, expenses are accruable at the time economic
performance has taken place. Generally, economic performance will occur at the time the services
to which the liability relates have been rendered. See I.R.C. § 461(h)(2)(A)(i) (2006); Treas. Reg. §
1.461-4(d)(6) (1999). However, accruals for compensation expense are generally limited to
amounts that are paid within two and one-half months after the end of the corporation’s taxable
year. See Temp. Treas. Reg. 1.404(b)-1T, A-2(b)(1) (1992).
201. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1979). Generally, a taxpayer will be deemed to be in constructive
receipt of income if the funds are set aside and not subject to the general claims of the employer’s
creditors or if the agreement to defer income is executed after the services that give rise to the claim
for compensation are rendered. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 70-435, 1970-2 C.B. 100; Rev. Rul. 64-279,
1964-2 C.B. 121; Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C. B. 174. Section 409A, discussed at infra notes 203219 and accompanying text, imposes additional requirements on the ability to defer compensation.
The doctrine of constructive receipt should not be confused with the constructive realization of
income. In certain cases, statutory rules require that income be realized prior to the time that such
income would have been realized under general income realization principles. For example, markto-market accounting rules will result in income realization despite the absence of a transaction that
results in a disposition of the asset in question. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 475; 1256 (2006).
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which the deferred amounts may be withdrawn, may provide for interest
accruals on the amounts deferred, and may provide offsets for amounts
payable under qualified plans. Amounts deferred may also be subject to
substantial risk of forfeiture due to, for example, a continuing
employment requirement. Whether, and to what extent, bonus-deferral
arrangements succeed in postponing the employee’s incidence of
taxation depends on whether the deferral arrangements meet the
requirements of Internal Revenue Code Section 409A. Prior to the
enactment of Section 409A, the only obstacle to the postponement of
income recognition that such arrangements faced was the doctrine of
constructive receipt—an obstacle easily avoided.202
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004203 added Section 409A to
the Internal Revenue Code to combat perceived abuses in the design and
operation of deferred-compensation plans.204 Particular opprobrium was
directed at deferred-compensation plans or arrangements that granted
employees a great deal of control or access to amounts deferred and
those plans or arrangements designed to effectively shield assets of the
employer from the claims of creditors.205 Section 409A imposes certain
operational and design requirements on deferred compensation plans
within its scope.206 The statute has a broad reach, encompassing any
plan, other than those specifically exempted, that provides for the

202. Unfunded deferred compensation arrangements, if properly implemented, generally raise
no constructive-receipt issues because the employee has received nothing more than the employer’s
unsecured promise to pay the compensation at some future point in time. Funded deferredcompensation plans will also not result in constructive receipt provided, among other requirements,
that the assets held by the employer to secure the obligation to pay the deferred compensation are
subject to the claims of the employer’s creditors. The Internal Revenue Service has issued guidance
and a model trust agreements for these funded arrangements, known as “Rabbi Trusts.” See Rev.
Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422.
203. Pub. L. No. 108-357, §885(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1634-41 (2004).
204. This provision does not override other statutory provisions or any other rule of law that
would require income to be recognized earlier than the time required by § 409A. See I.R.C. §
409A(c) (2006). The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 801,
122 Stat. 3765, 3929-30 (2008), added § 457A to the Internal Revenue Code. This provision
requires recognition of income from nonqualified deferred compensation plans maintained by
certain tax-indifferent corporations and partnerships at the time the income is no longer subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture. In general, deferred-compensation plans of foreign corporations and
partnerships that allocate more than an insubstantial portion of their income to foreign corporations
and tax-exempt entities are subject to § 457A. Exceptions are made for foreign corporations that are
subject to a comprehensive foreign income tax or that earn substantially all of their income in
connection with the conduct of a trade or business in the United States. See generally Notice 20098, 2009-4 I.R.B. 347, § 6, Question 6 (Jan. 26, 2009).
205. H.R. REP. NO. 108-548, pt.1, at 343 (2004).
206. See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
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deferral of compensation.207 Effective for amounts deferred after
December 31, 2004, Section 409A(a)(1) requires that all compensation
deferred under the plan for the taxable year and all preceding taxable
years be included in gross income during the taxable year in which the
deferred compensation plan fails to meet the requirements specified in
the statute.208 Moreover, interest is imposed on the amount of
compensation included in gross income pursuant to this provision in
addition to a twenty percent penalty on the amount so included.209
Regulations implementing the statute provide that a deferral of
compensation exists if, under the terms of the plan and the relevant facts
and circumstances, the service provider has a legally binding right to
compensation during the taxable year and such compensation is payable,
pursuant to the terms of the plan, in a later year.210
In the event the service recipient or other person may eliminate or
unilaterally reduce the compensation due to the service provider, then no

207. Qualified employer plans, such as pension and profit sharing plans, as well as bona fide
vacation, sick leave, compensatory time, disability pay, and death benefit plans are not subject to
these provisions. See I.R.C. § 409A(d)(1)-(2) (2006). The I.R.S. has broad regulatory authority to
exempt arrangements from the application of § 409A if such arrangements will not result in
improper deferral of U.S. tax and do not place assets beyond the reach of creditors. I.R.C. §
409A(e)(3) (2006).
Recently issued regulations exempt various medical reimbursement
arrangements and medical savings accounts from the application of § 409A. See generally Treas.
Reg. § 1.409A-1(a)(5) (2007). The regulations also exclude from § 409A deferral arrangements that
arise due to customary payroll procedures. For example, compensation is not deemed deferred
solely because the service provider is paid after the last day of such provider’s taxable year if such
payment is made under normal payroll timing procedures. Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(3) (2007).
Also not subject to § 409A are short-term deferrals. Absent an election to defer by the service
provider, compensation actually or constructively received by the later of the fifteenth day of the
third month following the end of the service provider’s first taxable year in which the amount is no
longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture or the fifteenth day of the third month following the
end of the service recipient’s first taxable year in which the amount is no longer subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture is not subject to section 409A. Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(4)(i) (2007).
208. Deferred compensation includes earnings, whether actual or notional, attributable to
deferred compensation or income. I.R.C. § 409A(d)(5) (2006). A plan failure will not result in the
application of this provision to all participants, only to those individuals to whom the plan failure
relates. I.R.C. § 409A(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2006). Proposed regulations were recently issued that provide
guidance on the calculation of required income inclusions and penalties for noncompliant plans.
See generally Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-4, 73 Fed. Reg. 74,380 (Dec. 8, 2008). Note that the
Internal Revenue Service will not issue rulings on whether a particular nonqualified deferred
compensation plan is subject to § 409A. See Rev. Proc. 2009-3, 2009-1 I.R.B. 107 (Jan. 5, 2009).
209. I.R.C. § 409A(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006). Interest is determined by applying the underpayment
rate plus one percentage point to underpayments that would have resulted had the deferredcompensation amounts been included in the tax year deferred or, if later, in the taxable year such
deferred compensation was no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. I.R.C. §
409A(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2006).
210. Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(1) (2007).
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legally binding right to the compensation exists.211 However, if the
unilateral right to reduce or eliminate the compensation is exercisable
only upon a condition, or if such discretion lacks substantive
significance, then such right is ignored.212 The regulations state:
“[C]ompensation is not considered subject to unilateral reduction or
elimination merely because it may be reduced or eliminated by operation
of the objective terms of the plan, such as application of a
nondiscretionary, objective provision creating a substantial risk of
forfeiture.”213
Deferred-compensation plans subject to an objective,
nondiscretionary clawback feature, such as those triggered by earnings
restatements, will, therefore, be subject to Section 409A, despite the fact
that all or a portion of the compensation may be forfeited. It is not clear,
however, whether clawbacks triggered by the application of vague,
generalized standards, such as those applicable to the undertaking of
excessive or undue risk, will be considered sufficiently nondiscretionary
and objective for this purpose. It is hard to imagine that an employer’s
discretion in asserting clawback rights in such situations would be
unfettered. At a minimum, there would appear to be duty of good faith
and, perhaps, a reasonable-person standard in assessing whether the
employee took on excessive or undue risk. Many clawback provisions
are applicable at the discretion of the board of directors and, depending
on the specific terms of such provisions and the extent of the board’s
discretion, it is possible that Section 409A may not apply to deferred
compensation subject to such clawback provisions—at least while the
compensation is subject to clawback.214
A detailed analysis of Section 409A is beyond the scope of this
work. In general terms, three design and operational requirements are
imposed
on
covered
nonqualified
deferred
compensation
arrangements.215 First, the plan may not permit early distributions, as
defined.216 Second, the plan may not permit the acceleration of benefits

211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. (emphasis added).
214. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
215. See infra notes 216-218 and accompanying text.
216. A plan may not permit deferred compensation to be distributed earlier than separation
from service, disability, death, a specified time pursuant to a fixed schedule specified in the plan,
change in control events, or the occurrence of an unforeseeable emergency.
I.R.C. §
409A(a)(2)(A)(i)-(vi) (2006).
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except as otherwise permitted.217 Finally, deferral elections, and certain
changes thereto, must be made within prescribed time frames.218
Nonqualified deferred compensation plans subject to Section 409A may
provide participants with deferral elections only if the election to defer is
made by the end of the preceding taxable year or such other time
provided in regulations.219
In the event that a taxpayer is required, pursuant to a clawback
provision, to return cash compensation to the employer, the tax
consequences of the repayment will depend on several factors. The most
straightforward scenario would involve the repayment of a cash bonus
earned in prior years but subject to repayment through no fault of the
employee. For example, the repayment obligation may be triggered by a
restatement of earnings upon which the bonus was calculated, and the
restatement was not caused by any action of the employee obligated to
repay the compensation. A repayment under these circumstances would
be deductible and, moreover, should be eligible to the benefits offered
by Section 1341. At the time the bonus was received, the employee had
an apparent, but not absolute right, to the income.220 The fact that the

217. Pursuant to the terms of the plan, an initial deferral election, or subsequent deferral
election, payments may be accelerated due to separation from service, death, disability, change on
control, or unforeseeable emergencies. See Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-3(j) (2007). Payments may be
made to a person other than the service provider pursuant to a domestic relations order. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.409A-3(j)(4)(ii) (2007). Payments may also be made to comply with an order of divestiture due
to conflicts of interest pursuant to I.R.C. § 1043 or, for arrangements subject to I.R.C. § 457(f), to
pay taxes upon a vesting event. Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-3(j)(4)(iii)-(iv) (2007). Moreover, payments
may be made to pay certain employment taxes or to the extent of amounts included in gross income
as a result of a plan failing to meet the requirements of § 409A. Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-3(j)(4)(vi)(vii) (2007). The rules also provide service recipients with a modicum of flexibility by allowing
such service recipients to unilaterally pay amounts due to separated participants in lump sum form.
Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-3(j)(4)(v) (2007).
218. Participants in their first year of eligibility under the plan may elect to defer within thirty
days of their eligibility date. I.R.C. § 409A(a)(4)(B)(i) (2006). In the case of performance-based
compensation covering a period of at least twelve months, a participant may elect to defer
compensation no later than six months before the end of the service period. I.R.C. §
409A(a)(4)(B)(iii) (2006). Service providers who are awarded bonuses or other compensation in
the middle of a year will find the general rule applicable to timing of deferral elections useless. For
example, an election to defer compensation under a bonus program instituted in 2008 that covers
services provided in 2008 would have to be made by the service provider by December 31, 2007.
Unless the service provider is unusually prescient, it is unlikely that such an election will have been
made. The regulations, however, provide that an election to defer compensation subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture due to a condition requiring at least twelve months of continued service
by the service provider may be made within thirty days after the service provider obtains a legally
binding right to payment and within at least twelve months prior to the earliest date that the
forfeiture condition could lapse. Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-2(a)(5) (2007).
219. I.R.C. § 409A(a)(4)(B)(i) (2006).
220. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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employee had no right to the income was established after the close of
the taxable year in which the income was received.221 Assuming the
amount of compensation repaid exceeds $3,000, Section 1341 should
apply.222
The application of Section 1341 is less clear in the event that the
taxpayer bore some level of culpability for the earnings restatement or if
the clawback is triggered by subsequent events. In the event that the
employee, through deliberate action, knowingly falsified earnings or
other relevant metrics in order to increase the bonus payable, then a
strong case may be made that Section 1341 should be inapplicable. In
such a case, the employee had no right to the income, apparent or
otherwise.223
Generally, only high-level employees have the
wherewithal to doctor earnings. However, in certain cases, lower-level
employees may have significant sway over the metrics upon which a
bonus is determined.224 For example, a bonus based on gross revenues,
growth in gross revenues, or gross revenues in excess of a pre-defined
threshold may tempt employees to inflate sales through improper
techniques—channel stuffing, for example.225 Section 1341 should be
denied in such cases. The more localized the metrics, the greater the
control that can be exercised by lower-level employees.226

221. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 181-182 and accompanying text.
224. See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
225. Channel stuffing refers to the practice of placing larger quantities of inventory than
needed by a customer, coupled with a side agreement that the excess inventory will be returned.
Other techniques for inflating revenue include mischaracterization of contract terms and bifurcation
of contracts to allow sellers with on-going service obligations to recognize greater revenue from
transactions than would otherwise be appropriate. The software industry is particularly vulnerable
to such practices. See generally RECOGNITION AND MEASUREMENT IN FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 5, § 83(b) (Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd. 1984); SOFTWARE REVENUE RECOGNITION, STATEMENT OF POSITION
97-2 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1977); Revenue Recognition in Financial Statements,
SEC STAFF ACCOUNTING BULLETIN NO. 101 (Dec. 3, 1999), available at
http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab101.htm. “Round-tripping” is another form of revenue
manipulation. A “round-trip” transaction is one in which the purchaser receives funds from the
seller and undertakes a reciprocal obligation to purchase goods or services from the seller. See, e.g.,
David D. Kirkpatrick, Shares Are Up, But Lawsuits May Unsettle AOL’s Future, N.Y. TIMES, July
7, 2003, at C1 (reporting on litigation commenced against AOL for purportedly inflating revenue by
$190 million through “round-trip” transactions). See also Daniel V. Dooley, Financial Fraud:
Accounting Theory and Practice, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 53 (2002).
226. Metrics that are based on the performance of a single unit or division may be influenced
by employees in the unit or division. At the extreme, metrics based on individual performance
measurements are susceptible to influence by the individual employee to whom the metric relates.
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A more contentious issue will arise if the clawback is triggered by
subsequent events. For many reasons, earnings that are properly
reported in an earlier period may ultimately prove ephemeral with the
benefit of hindsight. However, the prior year earnings may not be
subject to restatement. Instead, losses are recognized in a later period.
The current predicament in which many financial institutions find
themselves has been caused, in large part, by seemingly profitable
transactions ultimately proving unprofitable as a result of subsequent
events. Clawbacks triggered under such circumstances may not be
eligible for Section 1341 treatment. The Internal Revenue Service is
likely to argue that, at the time that the compensation was earned, the
taxpayer had an absolute, not apparent, right to the income.227 If an
employer finds it necessary to institute a clawback to recoup income in
such circumstances then it may behoove the employer to defer the bonus
until it can be determined, with the benefit of hindsight, whether it has,
in fact, been earned. Not paying the bonus in the first place is much
cleaner than paying it and subsequently requesting the employee to pay
it back.228
If the clawback provision causes the forfeiture of deferred cash
compensation then, unless the requirements of section 409A have not
been met throughout the deferral period, the clawback provision will
have no tax consequences.229 Because the income has never been
realized by the employee, its subsequent forfeiture is a non-event—tax
wise, at least. If, however, Section 409A served to accelerate the
taxation of the deferred compensation then the tax consequences of the
forfeiture of the deferred compensation would be similar to those
discussed above with respect to cash bonuses.230 As mentioned
previously, Section 409A also imposes, in addition to the regular tax on
the deferred earnings, an interest charge and twenty percent penalty.231
If Section 1341 applies, the statutory language allows for the
recoupment of the interest and penalty. The benefit derived under
Section 1341 is determined by the “the decrease in tax under this
chapter” that would have resulted if the income had not been reported in

227. See supra notes 185-187 and accompanying text.
228. This is a common practice with respect to sales commissions. Many employers remit
commissions only after the sale on which the commissions were earned have been paid for by the
customer.
229. This assumes, of course, that the employee was not in constructive receipt of the deferred
income. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
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the year of receipt.232 Section 409A states that “the tax imposed by this
chapter” is increased by the interest and penalty.233 Therefore, the
interest and penalty charges imposed under Section 409A are deemed
taxes under Chapter 1 and, therefore, may be recouped by the
application of Section 1341.234
2. Compensation Paid in Property.
It is also common for performance-based compensation to be paid
in property—typically employer stock or options on employer stock.
Stock-based compensation systems are justified, in part, by the
propensity of such arrangements to align the interests of management
and shareholders—a justification that has, in recent years, been called
into question.235 Section 409A is less of a concern with respect to equity
based compensation because the regulations provide a broad exemption
for certain equity based compensation arrangements. For example,
Treas. Reg. Section 1.409A-1(b)(5)(i)(A) exempts, from the application
of section 409A, options to purchase service recipient stock subject to
taxation under Section 83 provided that the number of shares subject to
the option is fixed at the date of grant, the exercise price of the stock is
not less than the fair market value of the stock on such date, and that no
deferral feature, other than the deferral of income until exercise, is
provided.236 In effect, provided that the option, at the date of grant, is
not in the money and no deferral feature is provided, it will be exempt
from Section 409A.237
232. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(5)(B) (2006) (emphasis added).
233. I.R.C. § 409A(a)(1)(B) (2006) (emphasis added).
234. This is not the case with respect to the 20 percent excise tax imposed on excess goldenparachute payments pursuant to I.R.C. § 4999. This tax is imposed under Chapter 46 and, therefore,
is outside the scope of I.R.C. § 1341. Consequently, the recipient of excess parachute payments
subject to this tax would be unable to recoup this tax through the utilization of I.R.C. § 1341. See
I.R.C. § 4999(b) (2006) and 280G(b) (2006) for the definition of excess parachute payments.
Golden-parachute payments have been restricted for recipients of federal bailout funds. See supra
notes 45 and 55 and accompanying text.
235. See, e.g., Bebchuk et. al., supra note 26. Stock-based compensation schemes are also
utilized to avoid the limitation on the deductibility of executive compensation and, in the case of
stock options, offered financial accounting benefits. See infra notes 248 and 251 and accompanying
text.
236. The payment of the exercise price with previously acquired shares does not jeopardize the
exemption. See Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(5)(i)(D) (2007).
237. Moreover, grants of incentive stock options or options granted under an employee stock
purchase plan pursuant to I.R.C. § 423 are categorically exempted from § 409A. Treas. Reg. §§
1.409A-1(b)(5)(i)(C); 1.409A-1(b)(5)(ii) (2007). For a discussion of the taxation of incentive stock
options see infra notes 251-69 and accompanying text. Similar rules are applicable to stock
appreciation rights. Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(5)(i)(B) (2007). The receipt of stock subject to a
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Internal Revenue Code Section 83(a) provides the general rule that the
actual or constructive receipt of property in exchange for services is a taxable
event at the time the property so received is transferable by the recipient or not
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever occurs earlier.238 The
amount of income recognized from such a transaction is the excess of the fair
market value of the property received over the amount paid by the recipient
for such property.239 Correspondingly, the transferor of the property is entitled
to a compensation deduction, at the time the recipient of the property
recognizes income, equal to the amount includible in the income of the
recipient.240 Consequently, receipt of employer stock that is immediately
vested with the employee results in income, at the time of receipt, equal to the
fair market value of the stock received.241
If, however, the stock is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, then
income recognition is postponed until such time as the risk of forfeiture
lapses. A substantial risk of forfeiture may be present as a result of
performance targets that must be met or by the presence of a continuing
employment requirement. For executives whose compensation is subject to
the $1 million deduction, limitations on performance-based restrictions are
typical.242 For other employees, a continuing employment restriction may be
the extent of the forfeiture risk. For example, assume an employee received a

substantial risk of forfeiture is generally not considered to result in a deferral of compensation for
purposes of § 409A. See Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(6) (2007).
238. I.R.C. § 83(a)(1) (2006).
239. I.R.C. § 83(a)(1)-(2) (2006). The fair market value of the property received is determined
at the time the property is transferable by the recipient or is not subject to substantial risk of
forfeiture, whichever is earlier. I.R.C. § 83(a)(1) (2006). Senator Carl Levin introduced legislation
in 2007 that, for nonqualified stock options, would decouple the amount of the employer’s
deduction from the amount of the employee’s income inclusion. The employer’s deduction would
be determined by the amount of compensation expense recognized for financial accounting
purposes. Moreover, the bill would eliminate the exemption of nonqualified stock options from the
$1 million expense limitation imposed by I.R.C. § 162(m). See Ending Corporate Tax Favors for
Stock Options Act, S. 2116, 110th Cong. (2007).
240. I.R.C. § 83(h) (2006). If appreciated or depreciated property is transferred to compensate
for services received then the transferor will recognize a gain or loss on the transfer as if the
property were sold for its fair market value. Because a corporation recognizes no gain or loss on the
transfer of its stock, or options thereon, this issue does not present itself in this context. See I.R.C. §
1032(a) (2006).
241. Any amount paid by the employee for the shares would, of course, reduce the amount of
compensation.
242. See infra note 250 for a discussion of the $1 million deduction limitation and the
exception to such limitation for performance-based compensation. A grant of stock that is awarded
without regard to some performance-based measurement will not qualify for the exception. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(A) (1995). Stock options, on the other hand, are deemed
performance-based provided that they are not in-the-money when granted. See infra note 250 and
accompanying text.
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grant of 10,000 shares of stock but the stock was subject to a four-year vesting
schedule pursuant to which 25 percent of the stock vested on each of the first
four anniversary dates of the grant. The employee must be employed with the
firm on the vesting dates. Assuming that the employee remained with the
firm throughout the vesting period, such employee would recognize income
in each of the succeeding four years equal to the fair market value, determined
at the time of vesting, of 2500 shares of employer stock. It is likely that the
trend toward “hold til (or through) retirement” policies, with respect to
performance-based awards, will result in a significantly greater number of
employees that are subject to vesting schedules for a portion of their
compensation.243
The postponement of taxation until the lapse of the vesting
restrictions imposed under the plan could expose the employee to a
significant tax liability if the stock’s value increases significantly
between the time of grant and the time that the stock is no longer subject
to substantial risk of forfeiture. As a consequence, the benefits of capital
gains tax rates and much, if not all, of the benefits of deferral may be
lost with respect to the increase in value that occurs between the time of
the stock’s grant and the date that the stock is no longer restricted.
Moreover, in order to pay the tax, the employee may be forced to sell the
stock which diminishes the incentive alignment that was a principle
reason for the stock’s issuance.244 The governing statute, however,
provides the property recipients with an alternative to the general rule.245
Internal Revenue Code Section 83(b) offers the property recipient
an election to accelerate the incidence of taxation to the time that the
property is transferred.246 Subsequent appreciation would be taxable if,
and when, the taxpayer disposes of the stock and would be taxed at
capital-gain rates. This election also accelerates the employer’s
compensation deduction. The election is not risk free, however. In a
declining market, the option holder will have recognized an amount of

243. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
244. After the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, employers could no longer make
loans to any director or executive officer. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 107-204, §
402(a), 116 Stat. 745, 787 (2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k)(1) (2006)). This
provision removes a significant source of liquidity for many executives. Id.
245. See I.R.C. § 83(b) (2006).
246. I.R.C. § 83(b) (2006). Section 83 applies to any property transferred in connection with
the performance of services even in cases where the service provider has paid fair market value for
the property. See Alves v. Comm’r, 734 F.2d 478, 479 (9th Cir. 1984). Therefore, despite the fact
that an employee has purchased restricted stock at the market price, in the absence of an I.R.C. §
83(b) election, appreciation up to the point the restrictions lapse will cause the stockholder to
recognize compensation income.
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compensation income based on the value of the stock at the date of
grant. Any subsequent decline in the value of the stock will generate a
capital loss upon disposition of the stock.247 Moreover, if the employee
fails to meet the vesting requirements, no loss is recognized upon the
forfeiture of the shares.248
Nonqualified stock options are also a commonly used method of
payment in performance-based compensation schemes.249
These
instruments offer several benefits to both the recipient and grantor of the
options. For the grantor, these instruments allow compensation to avoid
the limitation placed on deductions for executive compensation.250
Moreover, until recently, payment of compensation in the form of stock
options enjoyed favorable treatment for financial accounting purposes.251

247. Note that the election is irrevocable, except with the permission of the Commissioner.
I.R.C. § 83(b)(2) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(f) (1978).
248. I.R.C. § 83(b) (2006).
249. Incentive stock options are not subject to the general tax rules set forth in I.R.C. § 83.
These instruments are subject to different, very taxpayer-friendly rules and comprise a very limited
part of executive compensation packages. See infra notes 260-69 and accompanying text.
250. I.R.C. § 162(m)(1)-(3) (2006) provides that publicly traded corporations may not deduct
compensation in excess of $1 million paid to the chief executive officer or the four highest paid
officers other than the chief executive. However, this limitation does not apply to performancebased compensation. Performance-based compensation is defined as any remuneration payable
solely on account of the attainment of one or more performance goals I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C) (2006).
Such performance goals must be determined ex ante, and certified ex post, by an independent
compensation committee of the board of directors and approved by the shareholders. I.R.C. §
162(m)(4)(C)(i)-(iii) (2006). The regulations interpreting this provision provide that compensation
attributable to stock options is deemed to be performance-based if, inter alia, the amount of
compensation the employee could receive is based solely on an increase in the value of the stock
after the date of grant or award. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(A) (1995). Therefore, at-themoney or out-of-the-money options are considered performance-based while in-the-money options
are not, and no distinction is made between stock appreciation caused by market forces and firmspecific appreciation. In effect, any appreciation in the stock is considered performance-based. The
regulations provide certain limitations on option cancellations and re-pricings. If options are
cancelled and reissued due to a decline in the stock price, then the cancelled options are counted
toward the maximum number of shares, with respect to which the options may be granted under the
plan. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(B) (1995). Likewise, if options are re-priced, the regulations
deem the original options to have been cancelled and new options issued. Id. The regulations
provide exceptions for re-pricings that are prompted by certain corporate recapitalizations. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(3)(iii)(C) (1995); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-51-018 (Sept. 18, 2000).
Senator Carl Levin has introduced legislation that would subject nonqualified stock option
compensation to the $1 million compensation limit. See supra note 239. Recent legislation and
Treasury regulations have reduced the $1 million limitation to $500,000 in the case of financial
institutions participating in certain federal programs. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
251. In 1993 the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued an exposure draft that would
have required that the issuance of compensatory stock options be accounted for as an expense in an
amount determined under fair market value models. The business community in general and the
technology industry in particular fought the proposal vehemently. The Financial Accounting
Standards Board, under pressure from Congress, relented. See generally Melone, supra note 2, at
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The option recipient obtains the benefits of tax deferral. Nonqualified
stock options are subject to taxation in accordance with tax principles
applicable to compensatory transfers of property in general.252 However,
Treasury regulations provide that, with respect to the receipt of
compensatory stock options, the incidence of taxation is postponed until
such time that the options are exercised or are otherwise disposed of—if,
at the time the options are granted, they have no readily ascertainable
fair market value.253 Compensatory stock options are rarely subject to
tax when granted.254
Due to the symmetry that Section 83 creates between the timing
and amount of the employee’s income inclusion and the employer’s
deduction, the benefit of the employee’s income deferral is offset by the
concomitant deferral of the employer’s deduction. From the employee’s
perspective, the advantage of tax deferral is equivalent to an exemption
from tax on investment earnings on the after-tax compensation amount
that would have been received had compensation not been deferred.255
Stock options exaggerate this benefit due to the leverage inherent in such

554-58. In the aftermath of the corporate scandals that came to light earlier this decade public
sentiment turned markedly negative about the levels of executive compensation and efforts to
require expensing such options gained traction. The Financial Accounting Standards Board issued a
new standard that requires expensing of options effective, for most public companies, for interim
and annual reporting periods beginning after June 15, 2005. See SHARE-BASED PAYMENT,
Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards. No. 123 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2004). Recently
introduced legislation would conform the employer’s tax treatment of such options to their
treatment for financial accounting purposes. See supra note 239.
252. The extent of the relative deferral and conversion benefits enjoyed by recipients of
compensatory stock options vary depending on whether the options are qualified or nonqualified.
Qualified stock options are of two types: incentive stock options and those granted pursuant to an
employee stock purchase plan. The recipient of an incentive stock option does not recognize
taxable income upon either the grant of the option or its exercise. Rather, the incidence of taxation
is postponed until the option holder disposes of the stock acquired through the exercise of the
option, at which time the income is taxed at capital-gain rates. See infra notes 260-278 and
accompanying text.
253. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(a) (2004). The regulations make clear that the incidence of taxation
is postponed until the date of exercise even though the option’s value is readily ascertainable prior
to exercise but after the date of grant. Id.
254. An option has an ascertainable fair market value if it is either actively traded on an
established market or is transferable by the option holder, is immediately exercisable, and if the
underlying property that is the subject of the option is subject to no restriction that has a significant
effect on such property’s value. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(b) (2004). Section 83(b) elections, discussed
at supra notes 246-248 and accompanying text, can have relevance to recipients of stock options.
Such an election may be advantageous if the stock received upon exercise of the options is subject
to a substantial risk of forfeiture at the time of exercise.
255. See David I. Walker, Is Equity Compensation Tax Advantaged?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 695,
709-10 (2005).
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instruments.256 The tax benefits available to the employee may be
captured by the employer or the government, or both.257 The deferral
benefits that attach to compensatory stock options are directly
attributable to the fact that such options’ value is not ascertainable at the

256. Tax deferral mimics the exemption of income on after-tax earnings. Therefore, the
benefits of tax deferral increase as the rate of return on investment increases. For example, if an
employee receives $1,000 in cash compensation she will retain, assuming a 30 percent tax rate,
$700. Assume that the $700 were invested in employer stock and held for five years at which point
the stock has doubled in value. Assuming a 15% capital gains tax the employee will be left with
$1295 (gross proceeds of $1400 less capital gains tax of $105). Alternatively, if the employee
deferred the compensation for five years at which time the amount deferred doubled in value then
the employee would incur a tax of $600 (30 percent of $2,000), leaving the employee with $1,400.
The difference between the two amounts is the amount of the tax incurred on the gain that resulted
from the investment purchased with after-tax dollars, or $105. Deferred compensation is
disadvantageous during a period of falling asset values. See Walker, supra note 255, at 715-17
(noting that the disadvantages are mitigated by the limitations imposed on the use of capital losses
and the possibility that the terms of the stock option grant may be adjusted ex-post).
257. A deferred-compensation arrangement frees up employer cash that otherwise would have
been used to compensate employees. If the employer invests the cash in operations, any increase in
operating earnings would increase taxable income and the tax on such increase would offset some of
the tax savings enjoyed by the employee. Alternatively, the employer may use such cash to
purchase its own shares or options on such shares in which case the return on the invested cash is
tax-free causing the U.S. Treasury to bear the burden of the tax savings. See I.R.C. § 1032 (2006).
Corporations with significant net operating losses will also avoid tax on investment earnings,
regardless of the source of such earnings. If the employer causes the employee to bear the entire
cost of the deferred deduction—the global contracting model—then the only difference, to the
employee, between the receipt of taxable compensation and deferred compensation is the difference
between the employee’s after-tax rate of return and the employer’s after-tax rate of return.
Professors Hall and Liebman of Harvard University analyzed the tax benefits of deferral from a
“global contracting” perspective. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive
Compensation, TAX POL’Y & ECON. 1, 14 (2000) (attributing the term “global contracting” to
MYRON SCHOLES & MARK WOLFSON, TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY (1992)). This perspective
assumes that a corporation will hold its after-tax cost constant and is, therefore, indifferent between
paying compensation today or investing the compensation amount for a period and paying the
compensation and the cumulative returns at the end of such period. Assume that an executive could
presently receive $1 million in taxable compensation, the executive’s personal marginal tax rate is
pt, and the corporation’s marginal tax rate is ct. The executive’s and the corporation’s after-tax rate
of return on investments is rp and rc, respectively. If the corporation pays the compensation
currently its cost, in present value terms, is the after-tax cost of the compensation, or $1 million *
(1-ct). If the corporation defers payment its after-tax cost in n years is ($1 million*(1+rc)n) * (1-ct).
In present value terms, however, the after tax cost is (($1 million*(1+rc)n) * (1-ct)) ÷ (1+rc)n
which is exactly the same as the cost of paying the compensation in taxable form or $1 million * (1ct). For the executive, the difference between the amounts accumulated after n years under each
scenario is a function of the difference between the executive’s personal rate of return on
investments and the rate of return earned by the corporation. An executive that received $1 million
in current compensation would accumulate, in after-tax dollars, $1 million * (1-pt)*(1+rp)n after n
years. Under the deferred compensation arrangement the amount that such executive would receive
is $1 million* (1-pt)*(1+rc)n. For example, if personal tax rates are expected to decline or, due to
personal idiosyncrasies, an executive can time the exercise of options in a low tax year, the benefits
of the deferral will increase.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol25/iss1/2

54

Melone: Adding Insult to Injury: The Federal Income Tax Consequences of t

MELONE_MACRO FROM WESTERN 3.3.10.DOC

2010]

3/15/2010 11:27 AM

ADDING INSULT TO INJURY: THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES

109

time of grant. Consequently, the transaction remains open until such
options are exercised at which time the resulting income is taxed as
As a result, option exercises often lead to
compensation.258
extraordinarily large amounts of income to the holders of options and
equally large deductions to the grantor corporation.259
3. Incentive Stock Options
The recipient of an incentive stock option does not recognize taxable
income upon either the grant of the option or its exercise.260 Instead, the
incidence of taxation is postponed until the option holder disposes of the stock
acquired through the exercise of the option.261 Consequently, incentive stock
options offer the employee the ability to defer tax indefinitely. Moreover, the
tax incurred upon disposition of the stock, if such transaction results in a gain,
will be taxed at capital gain rates.262 Thus, these options offer, in addition to
tax deferral, the ability to convert compensation income into favorably taxed
capital gains.263 The quid pro quo for such favorable treatment of the option

258. Compensatory stock options issuances are rare examples of transactions that have Internal
Revenue Service imprimatur for “open transaction” treatment. See supra note 106 and
accompanying text.
259. Cisco Systems reported a tax benefit of approximately $2.5 billion for its fiscal year ended
July 2000 resulting from compensation deductions attributable to the exercise of employee stock
options. See Michelle Hanlon & Terry Shevlin, Accounting for Tax Benefits of Employee Stock
Options and Implications for Research, 16 ACCT. HORIZONS 1, 1-2 (2002). Legislation introduced
in 2007 would alter the employer’s tax treatment of nonqualified stock options. See supra note 239.
260. I.R.C. § 421(a)(1) (2006). The I.R.S. has issued proposed regulations that would subject
the exercise of incentive stock options to Federal Insurance Contribution Act and Federal
Unemployment Tax Act tax liability. See generally Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 31.3121(a)-1(k),
31.3306(b)-1(l), 31.3401(a)-1(b)(15), 66 Fed. Reg. 57023 (Nov. 14, 2001). Representative
Houghton and Senator Clinton, both from New York, have sponsored legislation to prevent the
imposition of payroll taxes upon exercise of incentive stock options. See H.R. 2695, 107th Cong.
(2001); S. 1383, 107th Cong. (2001).
261. I.R.C. § 421 (a)(1) (2006). The employee’s holding period for the stock commences on
the exercise date. See I.R.C. § 422(a) (2006). It is possible for I.R.C. § 83 to apply in situations
where the stock acquired upon the exercise of incentive stock options is subject to a substantial risk
of forfeiture. A recent Ninth Circuit case dealt with alternative-minimum tax issues arising from the
exercise of incentive stock options for which an I.R.C. § 83(b) election was made. In that case, a
portion of the shares the taxpayer received upon the exercise of the incentive stock options were
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. The taxpayer made a § 83(b) election and, therefore, was
subject to the alternative-minimum tax on the spread between the exercise price and the fair market
value of the shares on all his shares, including those that were not vested. Subsequently, the
taxpayer forfeited the unvested shares and sold them back to the employer at cost, thereby
increasing his capital loss. See infra note 278.
262. See I.R.C. § 1222(3) (2006); David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile
Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440, 466-67 (2000).
263. See I.R.C. § 1222 (2006).
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holder is the inability of the option grantor to deduct any amounts associated
with the compensatory option grant.264
Internal Revenue Code Section 422 provides the statutory
framework for incentive stock options.265 Stringent requirements are
imposed on such plans and several limitations are placed on both the
grantor and option holder.266 In order to qualify as an incentive stock
option, the option must be granted by the employer’s corporation
pursuant to a shareholder-approved plan.267 Options under such plans
must be granted within ten years from the earlier of the date such plan is
adopted or approved by the shareholders and must be exercisable within
ten years from the date of grant.268 The option’s strike price cannot be
less than the underlying stock’s fair market value.269 In addition, the
options must be nontransferable and exercisable only by the
employee.270
The aggregate fair market value of stock with respect to which such
options are exercisable in any calendar year may not exceed $100,000.271
This limitation accounts for their relative insignificance as a component
of executive compensation. A further restriction is placed on the option
holder that restricts her flexibility in disposing of any stock acquired
through exercise of such options. The holder of stock acquired through
the exercise of an incentive stock option may not dispose of such shares
within two years of the date the option was granted, nor within one year

264. I.R.C. § 421(a)(2) (2006).
265. See I.R.C. § 422 (b) (2006).
266. See infra note 267 and accompanying text.
267. I.R.C. § 422(b)(1) (2006). In the case of an affiliated group of corporations, the options
may be granted by the parent corporation or any subsidiary corporation despite the fact that such
issuing corporation does not employ the recipient of the option. I.R.C. § 422(b) (2006).
268. I.R.C. § 422(b)(2)-(3) (2006).
269. I.R.C. § 422(b)(4) (2006). Failure to meet this requirement will not disqualify the option
if such failure resulted from a good faith attempt to value the underlying stock. I.R.C. § 422(c)(1)
(2006).
270. I.R.C. § 422(b)(5) (2006). While the section does provide an exception for testamentary
dispositions, there is no exception made for transfers pursuant to a divorce. Id. Individuals
possessing more than 10 percent of the combined voting power of all classes of employer stock are
ineligible to receive such options unless the option’s strike price is at least 110 percent of the
underlying stock’s fair market value and the option is not exercisable prior to the expiration of five
years from the date of its grant. I.R.C. §§ 422(b)(6), 422(c)(5) (2006).
271. Id. If this limit is exceeded, then the options that exceed the limit, determined by order of
grant, are not eligible for incentive stock option treatment. In the event this limit is exceeded the
employer should specifically state that part of the options, to the extent of the limitation, are
incentive options and the excess options are nonqualified. See I.R.S. Notice 87-49, 1987-2 C.B.
355. The transfer agent should issue separate stock certificates identifying which stock was
acquired through the exercise of the incentive stock options. See id.
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after the exercise of the option.272 If the option holder disposes of the
stock prior to the expiration of the aforementioned period, then such
option is treated as a nonqualified option and the holder recognizes
income on the exercise of the option, and the employer corporation
generates a deduction equal to the amount the holder recognizes as
income.273
The alternative-minimum tax provides a potential burden to
incentive stock option holders. A detailed discussion of the alternativeminimum tax is beyond the scope of this work. In brief, the alternativeminimum tax is imposed if the taxpayer’s tentative minimum tax
exceeds her regular tax liability.274 The tax base, for this purpose, is the
taxpayer’s taxable income adjusted by certain statutorily defined items
and increased for certain tax preference items.275 In essence, this system
was designed to ensure that taxpayers making use of favorable tax
provisions incurred at least some tax liability.276 The ability to defer the
incidence of taxation beyond the time of the option’s exercise is not
available for alternative-minimum tax purposes.277 As a consequence,
taxpayers subject to the alternative-minimum tax lose a portion of their
deferral benefits. Such taxpayers, however, are entitled to a minimum
tax credit, but such credit is limited to use in years in which the taxpayer
272. I.R.C. § 422(a)(1) (2006). Moreover, the option holder must exercise such option within
three months of termination of employment. I.R.C. § 422(a)(2) (2006).
273. I.R.C. § 421(b) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(a) (1978). If the value of the stock has
decreased between the time the option was exercised and the time of the stock’s disposition, then
the amount the employee must include in income, and the employer may deduct, is limited to the
amount realized on the sale of the stock. I.R.C. § 422(c)(2) (2006). This is favorable for the
employee because it prevents the employee from recognizing a larger amount of compensation and
recognizing an offsetting capital loss that may or may not be currently deductible.
274. See Warren Rojas, Outdated AMT Claims First Victims of the 21st Century, 91 TAX
NOTES 691, 692 (2001) (describing the alternative-minimum tax with regard to incentive stock
options as a tax on the amount representing the difference between the option’s exercise price and
the fair market value of the stock when the option is exercised).
275. See id. (stating that, with regard to incentive stock options, the amount representing the
difference between the exercise price of the option and the fair market value of the stock when the
option is exercised results in an increase in tax debt since it is subject to the alternative-minimum
tax, even though the employee has not actually received any extra money).
276. For individual taxpayers, the tentative minimum tax is determined by applying a 26% tax
rate to the first $175,000 of alternative-minimum taxable income and a 28% rate to alternativeminimum taxable income in excess of $175,000. I.R.C. § 55(b)(1)(A)(i) (2006). The alternativeminimum tax is not an “add-on” tax as such. In essence, it is an alternative tax system with reduced
preferences and separate tax accounting rules. Adjustments to taxable income arising from the
application of different tax accounting rules will not alter the amount of income or deduction
resulting from a transaction over time but do alter the timing of the recognition of such income or
deduction. A credit mechanism is in place that allows a taxpayer to recoup past alternativeminimum tax payments that resulted from such timing differences.
277. I.R.C. § 56(b)(3) (2006).
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incurs only regular tax liability and its use is limited to the amount of
such liability.278
The recapture of equity-based compensation from an employee by
an employer pursuant to a clawback provision implicates many of the
same tax issues discussed above in connection with the clawback of cash
compensation. In the event that the employee has not yet realized
income for tax purposes, the forfeiture of such income will have no tax
consequences. For example, the forfeiture of restricted stock which has
not yet vested and for which no election under I.R.C. Section 83(b) had
been made will be a non-event for federal income tax purposes.279
Similarly, the forfeiture of compensatory stock options will have no tax
consequences.280 In situations where the employee has recognized
income from the receipt of property whether the subsequent forfeiture of
such income allows the employee to utilize the benefits of I.R.C. Section
1341 will depend on the resolution of issues similar to those discussed
above with respect to cash compensation.281
Despite the similarities in tax consequences between the forfeiture
of cash compensation and equity-based compensation, there are unique

278. See I.R.C. § 55 (2006). The statutes governing the alternative-minimum tax do not
address whether the capital-loss limitations imposed by I.R.C. §§ 1211 and 1212 apply for
alternative-minimum tax purposes. In 2006, the Tax Court, in Merlo v. Commissioner, 126 T.C.
205 (2006), held that the capital-loss limitations imposed by I.R.C. §§ 1211 and 1212 do indeed
apply for purposes of determining the alternative-minimum tax thereby denying the taxpayer’s
alternative-minimum tax net operating loss deduction. A federal district court held likewise. See
Norman v. United States, 2006-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P50,429, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52,609 (N. D.
Ca. 2006), aff’d. 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 16207 (9th Cir. 2008). Merlo was affirmed by the Fifth
Circuit. Merlo v. Comm’r, 492 F. 3d. 618 (5th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit recently joined the
Fifth Circuit in holding that the capital-loss limitations do indeed apply for alternative-minimum tax
purposes. See Kadillak v. Comm’r, 534 F. 3d. 1197 (9th Cir. 2008). The Tax Extenders and
Alternative-minimum tax Relief Act of 2008, part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008, abated all alternative-minimum tax liability, interest, and penalties resulting from the exercise
of incentive stock options outstanding on October 3, 2008, and provides a limited credit for interest
and penalties already paid that would have been abated had they not been paid. The Tax Extenders
and Alternative-minimum tax Relief Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 103(b), 122 Stat. 3765,
3864 (2008) (adding § 53(f) to the I.R.C.).
279. Property subject to substantial risk of forfeiture is not taxable until such substantial risk of
forfeiture lapses. I.R.C. § 83(b) allows the property recipient to include the value of the property
received in income at the time of its receipt notwithstanding the fact that is subject to forfeiture. See
supra notes 246-248 and accompanying text.
280. So long as the exercise price of the stock options equals or exceeds the fair market value
of the underlying stock on the date of the options’ grant, no taxable income is recognized by the
option recipient. Instead, income recognition is postponed until the options are exercised. See
supra note 253 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 220-227 and accompanying text.
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tax issues presented by the forfeiture of equity-based compensation.282
As previously discussed, I.R.C. Section 83(b) allows the recipient of
property subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture the option to include in
income, in the year such property is received, the value of the property at
the time of its receipt.283 The election to accelerate the income inclusion
from the receipt of property has its greatest benefit in situations where
the property appreciates between the time of its grant and the time the
substantial risk of forfeiture lapses.284 In such cases, the recipient of the
property is taxed based on the property’s lower value at the time of grant
and the incidence of taxation on the appreciation of the property is
deferred until such time as the property is sold. Moreover, assuming the
existence of favorable capital gain rates, the appreciation will be taxed at
lower rates. However, the benefit of I.R.C. Section 83(b) comes at a
price.
In addition to the fact that an election under I.R.C. Section 83(b)
accelerates the time at which a property transaction is taxable, no
deduction is available upon the subsequent forfeiture of the property.285
For example, assume that an executive was granted 10,000 shares of
employer stock with a fair market value of $500,000 in 2009. Under the
terms of the grant, the stock vests if certain performance metrics are met
for the employer’s fiscal year ending June 30, 2010. If the executive
makes the I.R.C. Section 83(b) election she will recognize $500,000 of
income in 2009. In the absence of such an election and assuming that
the performance metrics are met, she will recognize compensation
282. Generally, the forfeiture of nonqualified stock options will not create any tax
consequences because the recipient of the options is not taxed at the time the options are granted or
vested. Instead, the incidence of taxation is postponed until such time as the options are exercised.
See supra note 253 and accompanying text. However, if the option itself were subject to tax
because it had a readily ascertainable fair market value, then the tax consequences that would result
from forfeiture of the options would be similar to those that would result from the forfeiture of the
underlying stock itself. Id.
283. See supra notes 246-248 and accompanying text.
284. Assuming constant income tax rates, the election will prove beneficial so long as the
property appreciates at a rate that compensates the recipient for the time value of the funds used to
pay the tax earlier than necessary. In the event that tax rates decrease between the time that the
property is received and the time that the substantial risk of forfeiture lapses, the property will have
to appreciate at a rate sufficient to compensate for both the time value of money and the differential
in the tax rate in order for the election to have been worthwhile. In the event that tax rates increase
between the time the property is received and the time the substantial risk of forfeiture lapses, the
property will have to appreciate at a rate sufficient to compensate for the time value of money less
the differential in the tax rate in order for the election to have been worthwhile.
285. I.R.C. § 83(b)(1) (2006). In the event that the recipient of property paid for the property, a
capital loss is recognized upon the property’s forfeiture in an amount equal to the amount paid for
the property less any amount realized upon the property’s forfeiture. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(a)
(1978).
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income in 2010 equal to the value of the stock on the date of vesting in
2010. If the election is made and the performance metrics are not met,
then no deduction is permitted in 2010 when the stock is forfeited.
Consequently, the employee will recognize $500,000 of income which
she will not receive. Section 1341 provides no relief in this situation for
two reasons. First, Section 1341 requires that the amount in question be
deductible, which, due to Section 83(b), it is not.286 Second, the
employee has no apparent right to the income in the year of the
election.287 A Section 83(b) election causes the employee to recognize
income in the face of a substantial risk of forfeiture. At the time of the
election the employee is fully aware of such risk and, therefore, cannot
claim that such income was received under an apparent claim of right.
Less clear is the result that arises if the forfeiture occurs due to a
restatement of the metrics after the stock purportedly vested. Assume,
for example, that the performance metrics for the fiscal year ended June
30, 2010 were met. As a result, the stock award vested. Assume further,
however, that the results of fiscal year 2010 are restated at some point in
2011 and that the performance metrics, after restatement, are not met,
triggering a clawback of the stock. It is not clear whether the deduction
prohibition of I.R.C. Section 83(b)(2) applies in this situation. An
argument can be made that the stock award vested and, therefore,
Section 83(b) no longer controls. Alternatively, had the metrics been
measured properly, the stock would have never vested thereby triggering
the deduction prohibition pursuant to I.R.C. Section 83(b)(2). The
regulations issued under I.R.C. Section 83 would appear to favor the
former argument.
In effect, two risks of forfeiture are present. The first risk is that
the performance metrics are not met. This clearly is deemed a
substantial risk of forfeiture under the regulations. The second risk is
that, after vesting, the clawback provision is triggered due to some event,
such as a restatement of the metrics. This would not appear to be a
substantial risk of forfeiture under the regulations.288 In the event the
property recipient did not make the I.R.C. Section 83(b) election, she
would have been subject to tax on the receipt of the property in 2010 and
the risk of forfeiture due to possible restatement would have been

286. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
287. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
288. The regulations do not deal expressly with the possibility of restatements. However, the
examples provided indicate that events that do not commonly occur or that are subject to the control
of the employee are not considered substantial risks of forfeiture. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.833(b)(2) (2005).
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ignored. Therefore, if the property would have been subject to tax under
Section 83 in any event prior to its forfeiture, then any loss due to such
forfeiture should fall outside the scope of I.R.C. Section 83(b)’s
deduction prohibition.
Despite the fact that the forfeiture of compensation under these
circumstances may be deductible notwithstanding Section 83(b), it
would appear that I.R.C. Section 1341 relief would, nonetheless, be
unavailable. If no I.R.C. Section 83(b) election was made, then I.R.C.
Section 1341 could potentially be applicable because at the time the
income was received the recipient had an apparent right to such
income.289 However, accelerating the income to a time when the
property received was subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture would
appear to preclude any notion that the recipient had an apparent right to
the income. In the above example, the employee may have had an
apparent right to the stock in 2010 but certainly did not have any right,
apparent or otherwise, to the stock in 2009 when its value was included
in income. Section 1341 appears to be of no use in cases where the
original incidence of taxation was accelerated due to a Section 83(b)
election. In the event the property is forfeited due to its failure to vest,
Section 1341 would be inapplicable because no deduction is allowed for
the forfeiture. In the event the property vests but is later forfeited,
Section 1341 would be unavailable because the income was originally
recognized while it was subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture and,
thus, the recipient had no apparent right to such income.
The forfeiture of equity compensation also raises issues regarding
the nature of the forfeiture transaction for tax purposes. In the event that
a Section 83(b) election is in effect and the property is forfeited while
such property is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, the tax
consequences are straightforward. No deduction is available to the
employee upon the forfeiture of the property and any capital loss is
limited to the excess of the amount paid, if any, for the property by the
employee over the amount realized by the employee upon the property’s
disposition.290 However, if the property has substantially vested prior to
forfeiture, these rules are inapplicable.291 Consequently, a deduction
should be available to the employee. However, unlike the repayment of
cash compensation, the tax consequences of the forfeiture of equityflavored compensation are not so predictable. It is very unlikely that the

289. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 288-289 and accompanying text
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value of the shares forfeited will be equal to their value at the time such
shares were included in income. Conceivably, the forfeiture of the
shares represents a sale or exchange of the shares in settlement of a
liability to the employer resulting in a deduction in an amount equal to
the value of the shares at the time of forfeiture and a capital gain or loss
equal to the subsequent appreciation or depreciation, as the case may be,
of the shares. For example, assume that an employee received shares
worth $100,000 at the time they substantially vested and were included
in income. One year later the shares are forfeited when they are worth
$125,000. Arguably, the employee is entitled to a $125,000 deduction
accompanied by a $25,000 capital gain.292 However, the regulations
make clear that any loss that occurs from a forfeiture after the property
has substantially vested is an ordinary loss equal to the amount that the
employee included in income.293 Consequently, in the above example,
the employee would be entitled to an ordinary loss of $100,000.
In the event that the clawback extends to the profit generated from
the sale of stock, then the Arrowsmith doctrine would come into play.294
Consequently, the executive would realize a capital loss on the
repayment of such profits. Due to the limitations on the use of capital
losses, the applicability of Section 1341 is of heightened importance in
such situations. Whether the benefits of Section 1341 are available will
depend on the circumstances surrounding the clawback and whether
such circumstances allow for the application of this provision.

292. Under the regulations a forfeiture of property while such property is substantially nonvested is treated as a sale or exchange of the forfeited property for which any loss realized is limited
to the excess of the amount paid for the property over the amount realized upon the forfeiture.
However, these regulations apply to forfeitures of substantially non-vested property for which a
I.R.C. § 83(b) election was made. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(a) (1978).
293. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(e) (2003). In the event that the employee paid for the property, any
loss attributable to the amount paid would be a capital loss. The regulations deal explicitly only
with the amount of basis attributable to the employee’s income inclusion. It would appear that the
approach taken by Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(a), discussed at supra note 292, would apply in the event
that substantially vested property is forfeited and that a capital loss would realized upon forfeiture
equal to the excess of the amount paid for the property over the amount realized upon forfeiture.
Therefore, if the stock forfeited were acquired pursuant to the exercise of a nonqualified stock
option, then the loss attributable to the exercise price of the option would be a capital loss. The loss
attributable to the stock’s basis that resulted from the income inclusion caused by the exercise of the
option would be an ordinary loss.
294. See supra notes 153-164 and accompanying text. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
expressly covers such profits. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. It is quite possible that
contractual clawback provisions could also cover such profits.
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Incentive stock options are often used as a compensation vehicle
for lower-level management and other personnel.295 As previously
discussed, incentive stock options are favorably taxed to their recipients
but are subject to significant limitations that are not applicable to nonqualified options. Similar to non-qualified stock options, incentive stock
options may be subject to conditions that create a substantial risk of
forfeiture.296 Moreover, it appears that the language in the regulations is
broad enough to allow these instruments to be subject to clawback
provisions.297 For regular income tax purposes, the forfeiture of
incentive stock options poses little difficulty. In the event that the
incentive stock option is forfeited prior to exercise, its forfeiture is a
non-event, for tax purposes. The grant of the option is not taxable and,
therefore, its forfeiture has no income tax consequences.298 Likewise,
forfeiture prior to exercise would not implicate any alternative-minimum
tax issues because this tax is implicated only upon the exercise of the
incentive stock option.299
Forfeiture of stock acquired by the exercise of an incentive stock
option would not yield any deduction to the employee because, unlike
non-qualified options, the exercise of incentive stock options does not
generate any compensation income.300 Therefore, upon forfeiture of the
stock the employee would realize a capital loss equal to the difference
between the amount of the employee’s basis in the stock and the amount
realized upon its forfeiture. Among the requirements for the application
of the favorable tax rules enjoyed by holders of incentive stock options
295. The annual $100,000 limitation on the aggregate fair market value of stock with respect to
which incentive stock options are exercisable limits their utility as a tool for compensating upper
management. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
296. See Treas. Reg. § 1.422-5(d)(1) (2004).
297. The regulations provide that “[a]n option does not fail to be an incentive stock option
merely because the option is subject to a condition . . . .” Id. Given the limitations on the amounts
that may be granted under incentive stock option plans, it is not all that common for incentive stock
options to be subject to clawback provisions. These instruments are commonly issued to middle
management and rank and file employees and, although they may be subject to vesting restrictions,
it is rare for issuances to these employees to be conditioned on performance metrics. Note that in
order for an option to qualify as an incentive stock option it must, among other requirements, be
exercised while the option holder is an employee or have been exercised no later than three months
after the option holder’s termination of employment. The three-month grace period is extended to
one year in the event the option holder’s employment ceased due to permanent and total disability.
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.422-1(a)(1)(i)(B); 1.422-1(a)(3) (2004).
298. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
299. Unlike non-qualified stock options, the exercise of incentive stock options is not a taxable
event for regular income tax purposes. However, the difference between the fair market value of
the underlying shares and the options’ exercise price is taxable for alternative-minimum tax
purposes. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 260-261 and accompanying text
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is that the stock acquired through the exercise of the option not be
disposed of prior to two years after the grant of the option and one year
after the exercise of the option.301 Although the regulations do not
expressly address it, it would appear that a forfeiture within this period
would be considered a disqualifying disposition. A disqualifying
disposition would result in the option being subject to tax under the
general rules of Section 83 and recognition of compensation income in
the year of such disqualifying disposition.302 Under general rules, the
forfeiture would cause the option holder to recognize compensation
income that would be offset by a concomitant deduction as a result of
the forfeiture.303 However, the regulations contain a special rule that
prevents this result. Under this rule, the amount of compensation
income to be recognized by the employee upon a disqualifying
disposition is limited to the amount of gain recognized by the employee
upon the disposition.304 Because it is very unlikely that any gain would
result from such forfeiture, no compensation income—nor related
deduction—would be recognized by the employee upon such a
forfeiture.
The application of the alternative-minimum tax complicates the tax
consequences of forfeitures of incentive stock options. The spread
between the fair market value of the stock and the exercise price of the
incentive stock option at the time of exercise is taxable for alternativeminimum tax purposes.305 Thus, for alternative-minimum tax purposes,
these instruments resemble non-qualified stock options. Forfeiture of
incentive stock options prior to their exercise would create no
alternative-minimum tax consequences because the grant of such options
is not taxable for alternative-minimum tax purposes.
However, unlike the consequences for regular income tax purposes,
forfeiture of the stock acquired through the exercise of incentive stock
options creates tax consequences similar to those encountered from the
forfeiture of stock acquired through the exercise of non-qualified stock
options.306 Consequently, in the absence of a Section 83(b) election,

301. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
302. See Treas. Reg. § 1.421-2(b)(1) (2004).
303. Neither the rescission doctrine nor the Merrill doctrine would appear to apply in this case.
These doctrines have limited application and the acquisition of stock through the exercise of an
option, and the subsequent forfeiture of that stock, does not constitute the rescission of a contract.
Moreover, the Merrill doctrine applies to income erroneously received and acknowledged as such in
the same taxable year as its receipt. See supra notes 125-129 and accompanying text.
304. See Treas. Reg. § 1.422-1(b)(2)(i) (2004).
305. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 279-294 and accompanying text.
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forfeiture of the stock would lead to a deduction, for purposes of the
alternative-minimum tax, as a result of the forfeiture. The benefit of this
deduction may be illusory, however. If the taxpayer is not subject to the
alternative-minimum tax, then no direct current benefit would be
obtained from the deduction. Such a deduction may, however, increase
the amount of the minimum tax credit available against the taxpayer’s
regular tax liability.307 The minimum tax credit is available to offset a
taxpayer’s regular tax liability but is limited to an amount equal to the
excess of the taxpayer’s regular tax liability over the amount of the
taxpayer’s tentative minimum tax.308 In effect, the credit will reduce the
taxpayer’s regular tax liability up to the point where any further
reduction would trigger the alternative-minimum tax. As result, a
deduction that reduces the tentative minimum tax has the effect of
increasing the available credit for regular tax purposes.309
Under the appropriate circumstances the taxpayer may also make
use of Section 1341 whose benefits are broad enough to encompass the
alternative-minimum tax.310 If the taxpayer made a Section 83(b)
election for alternative-minimum tax purposes then, for reasons similar

307. Many of the differences between the tax bases for regular tax and alternative-minimum
tax purposes result from timing differences in the recognition of income or expenses.
Consequently, it is possible that taxpayers will incur a minimum tax liability in certain years and
then incur a regular tax liability for the same items in later years. The minimum tax credit is the
mechanism by which attempts to ameliorate this result. See generally I.R.C. § 53 (2006). In effect,
the minimum tax credit converts the alternative-minimum tax, at least in part, to a prepayment of
the regular tax. Timing differences are not tracked individually and, therefore, the minimum tax
credit does not neatly track the exact effects of timing differences. For example, it is irrelevant, for
purposes of determining the availability of the credit, whether the timing differences that created the
credit reversed themselves in the year in which the credit is used. Id.
308. See I.R.C. § 53(c) (2006). Notwithstanding the general limitation, a special rule allows
taxpayers to use a minimum amount of long-term credits for tax years ending before 2013. See
I.R.C. § 53(e) (2006).
309. Intuitively, this result is appropriate. To the extent that the exercise of the options in an
earlier year resulted in alternative-minimum tax liability, the subsequent forfeiture of the gains from
those options should result in recoupment of that tax liability—in this case through an increase in
the minimum tax credit.
310. I.R.C. § 1341 is applicable to any taxes imposed by Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue
Code. I.R.C. § 1341(a) (2006). The alternative-minimum tax is imposed under Chapter 1,
Subchapter A, Part VI. The application of I.R.C. § 1341 is muddled by the alternative-minimum tax
credit. It is quite possible that all or a portion of the alternative-minimum tax imposed in an earlier
has already been recouped in a subsequent year or years through the use of alternative-minimum tax
credit. See supra note 278. It would appear inappropriate for a taxpayer to be able to recoup the
alternative-minimum tax paid in the year the options were exercised in toto without reduction for
the amount of such already recouped in a subsequent year. The statutory language is broad enough
to prevent this result. Section 1341 yields a reduction in tax for the current year in an amount equal
to the decrease in tax for the prior year or years which would result from the exclusion of the gain
from the exercise of incentive stock options. See I.R.C. § 1341(a)(5)(B) (2006) (emphasis added).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010

65

Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 25 [2010], Art. 2

MELONE_MACRO FROM WESTERN 3.3.10.DOC

120

AKRON TAX JOURNAL

3/15/2010 11:27 AM

[25:55

to those previously discussed with respect to forfeitures of stock
acquired through the exercise of non-qualified stock options, no
deduction would be available upon the forfeiture of the stock and,
accordingly, the benefits of Section 1341 would be unavailable.311
IV. CONCLUSION
Compensation clawback provisions are proliferating. The SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 provided for the clawback of certain forms of
compensation but limited its reach to a small number of executive
officers of publicly traded entities and required the intervention of the
Securities and Exchange Commission for enforcement. The rapidity
with which large financial institutions met their demise—or averted such
demise due to government largess—has prompted a reassessment of
incentive compensation structures that many commentators believe
encouraged excessive leverage and imprudent short-term risk taking.
Legislation enacted in late 2008 and early 2009 mandated clawback
provisions in executive compensation arrangements for firms receiving
federal financial assistance. Moreover, shareholders and directors,
emboldened by the recent chain of events, have begun demanding
greater accountability from their executives resulting in the
implementation of clawback provisions in industries far removed from
Wall Street and the financial sector. Whether clawback provisions will
lead to greater prudence on the part of management or stifle creativity
remains to be seen. However, these provisions strike the public at large
as a common-sense approach to achieve a measure of fairness.
The federal income tax consequences to executives forced to repay
or forfeit compensation is complicated—and not entirely fair. The tax
consequences of repaid or forfeited compensation are dependent upon
311. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. An election pursuant to I.R.C. § 83(b) is not
available, for regular tax purposes, for incentive stock options because such instruments are not
taxable under I.R.C. § 83. However, because, for alternative-minimum tax purposes, incentive
stock options are taxable upon exercise, such an election is permissible for purposes of the
alternative-minimum tax. See Treas. Reg. § 1.422-1(b)(3), Example 2 (2004). Such an election
exposes the taxpayer to the prohibition on the deduction of losses resulting from the forfeiture of the
stock. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. Although such a result may cause the taxpayer
to have a larger capital loss on the forfeiture, the courts have held that the capital-loss limitations
applicable to the calculation of the regular tax liability apply for alternative-minimum tax purposes.
See supra note 278. See id. for a discussion of the moratorium on the collection of alternativeminimum tax liability resulting from the exercise of incentive stock options. Note that if the
incentive stock options were no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture but were forfeited
pursuant to a clawback provision a deduction would be available for alternative-minimum tax
purposes. However, I.R.C. § 1341 would be inapplicable if an election under I.R.C. § 83(b) were in
effect. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
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the federal income tax treatment of the compensation subject to the
clawback. The annual accounting concept virtually assures that the tax
benefits derived from the deduction that results from the clawback will
not correspond to the tax burden imposed upon the executives in the year
the compensation was received. I.R.C. Section 1341, an ameliorative
provision, may or may not apply depending upon the particular
circumstances surrounding the clawback. With respect to equity-based
incentive compensation executives will have to rethink the desirability
of the I.R.C. Section 83(b) election. Although the decision to make such
election has always required careful analysis, the potential that such
compensation may be clawed back adds another, quite significant, factor
to consider. The benefits of I.R.C. Section 1341 will not apply to
compensation for which such an election was made.
The potential that executives will fail to come close in recouping
the taxes paid on compensation that they cannot retain may result in
longer deferrals of incentive compensation. The forfeiture of untaxed
compensation may be relatively less painful, from both a psychological
and tax standpoint, than the repayment of previously taxed income. To
borrow from a famous adage: In the case of compensation it is not better
to have been paid and lost than not to have been paid at all.
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